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INTRODUCTION
Two important debates in intellectual property policy have come into
confluence in an unlikely setting. The first debate weighs the relative mer-
its of the traditional intellectual property paradigms (patent and copyright)
against new, sui generis paradigms.1 The second debate asks how intellec-
tual property rules should respond to contemporary technological ad-
vances. 2 The unlikely setting is plant variety protection, one of the least
studied of all forms of intellectual property. 3 In this paper, we draw from
both debates to derive some conclusions about the potential for intellectual
property regimes--especially sui generis, industry-specific intellectual
property regimes like plant variety protection-to become compromised as
a result of technological change, and perhaps even face the prospect of
eventual obsolescence. We also explore various responses. We lay out an
alternative structure for plant intellectual property protection that differs
radically in some respects from plant variety protection, and we investigate
how our alternative structure might operate as a discussion model for im-
proving existing plant variety protection regimes.
First generation plant variety protection ("PVP") systems appeared in
the 1960s, following the conclusion of the UPOV treaty. 4 In 1970, the U.S.
1. This debate owes much to the work of Professor Reichman. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Legal
Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994) (cataloguing
and analyzing many sui generis regimes).
2. For example, in patent law, scholars have begun to explore how patent rules might be tailored
to produce innovation policy for particular technology sectors. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003). William Landes and Judge Richard Posner have
observed that a "radical restructuring of intellectual property law" that is "better informed by scientific
and technological understanding and more heavily focused on current and likely scientific and techno-
logical advances... may be overdue." WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 423-24 (2003). And copyright, since its inception, has
witnessed titanic struggles over the law's ability to accommodate new technologies for creating and
delivering creative works. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO
THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (Hill & Wang 1996) (1994) (concisely summarizing the historical patterns).
3. As of 2002, when one of us (Janis) co-authored a study of the U.S. PVPA, PVP systems had
been studied in very few law review articles. Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protec-
tion: Sound and Fury ... ?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 727 (2002) [hereinafter Janis & Kesan (2002)]. Since
then, a few major studies were completed or are forthcoming. See LAURENCE R. HELFER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PLANT VARIETIES: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES AND POLICY
OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS (2004) (describing multiple forms of intellectual property
protection for plants); MARGARET LLEWELYN & MIKE ADCOCK, EUROPEAN PLANT INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (2006); Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in
Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105 (2005).
4. "UPOV" refers to the French-language title of the treaty and its governing organization (Un-
ion Internationale pour la Protection des Obtentions Vegetales). The 1961 UPOV text, adopted De-
cember 2, 1961, supplied the framework for a number of domestic first-generation PVP systems. See
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703,
815 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter UPOV (196 1)), available at http://www.upov.int/en/publications/ conven-
tions/1961/pdf/actl961.pdf (English text of the 1961 Convention). The Convention officially came into
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Congress enacted plant variety protection in the form of the Plant Variety
Protection Act ("PVPA").5 In the early 1990s, pressure from the plant
breeding community and others led to the development of a second genera-
tion of PVP systems governed by an amended UPOV treaty. 6
Plant variety protection now stands at a critical juncture. 7 Decisions in
the U.S.8 (confirming the availability of utility patent protection for plants,
including plant varieties) and in Europe9 (confirming the availability of
utility patent protection for plants while excluding plant varieties as such)
may draw breeders and seed companies away from plant variety protection
systems. In the U.S., predictions that plant variety protection may become
"the Neanderthal of intellectual property systems" 10 seem increasingly
plausible, at least in the area of major cereal crops.
On the other hand, more than sixty countries now have enacted first-
or second-generation PVP systems, I" and over 61,000 PVP certificates are
in force in UPOV member states (predominantly in major intellectual prop-
erty jurisdictions, 12 but also in important agricultural economies' 3). In
force on August 10, 1968, after ratifications by Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
See UPOV Convention, http://www.upov.int/en/about/upov-convention.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
5. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2000). The U.S. PVPA complied with many, but not all, elements of
the 1961 UPOV Convention.
6. See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, as
amended Mar. 19, 1991 [hereinafter UPOV (1991)], available at http://www.upov.int/en/ publica-
tions/conventions/1991/pdf/actl991.pdf (English text of the 1991 Convention). The U.S. became a
UPOV member in 1981 by executive agreement, but did not ratify the treaty, and deposit its instrument
of ratification, until early 1999. See Janis & Kesan (2002), supra note 3, at 745 n.89 (citing relevant
legislative sources). The current version of the U.S. PVPA conforms to 1991 UPOV.
7. It is perhaps no coincidence that the UPOV organization recently released a major report
lauding the successes of PVP systems. UPOV, REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF PLANT VARIETY
PROTECTION, UPOV Pub. No. 353 (E) (2005) [hereinafter UPOV IMPACT REPORT].
8. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (plants qualify
as eligible subject matter under the utility patent statute); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (statutory exceptions that limit PVPA rights do not carry over to utility patent
rights).
9. Case G 01/98, Novartis/Transgenic Plant, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. Ill (Enlarged Bd. App.1999),
available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t961054eul.pdf (holding that plants qualify
as eligible subject matter for European patent protection; only claims to plant varieties as such are
excluded); Council Directive 98/44, On the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. 4(2),
1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 18 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/1998/l213/
1_21319980730en00130021 .pdf (incorporating the ruling from Novartis).
10. CARY FOWLER, UNNATURAL SELECTION: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND PLANT EVOLUTION
152 (1994) [hereinafter FOWLER (1994)].
11. Called "plant breeder's rights" systems in some countries. For updated statistics, see UPOV,
Members of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, http://www.upov.int/
en/about/members/pdf/pub423.pdf (last visited May 30, 2007).
12. Including the U.S., Europe, and Japan. See UPOV, Plant Variety Protection Statistics for the
Period 1999-2003, at 4-14, UPOV Doe. No. C/38/7 (Oct. 15, 2004), available at http://www.upov.int/
en/documents/c/38/C_38_07.pdf.
13. For example, Australia and Argentina. Id. at 4. In China, the number of certificates is still
relatively small but has grown rapidly since the turn of the century. Id. at 5; see also Bonwoo Koo et al.,
2007]
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Europe, the investment in PVP legislation is particularly heavy: plant
breeders may seek protection under national systems, or may seek EU-wide
plant variety protection under the Community Plant Variety Protection
regulation. 14 And, under the TRIPS agreement, member states may opt to
enact "an effective sui generis system" of intellectual property protection
for plant varieties as an alternative to according utility patent protection, 15
an option with vigorous advocates in some parts of the world.16
While others have focused largely on these geopolitical crosscurrents
in assessing the future role of PVP systems, we focus on technological
change. We argue that dramatic technological advances in plant breeding,
particularly in the major cereal crops, have brought the threat of obsoles-
cence to existing PVP systems. We observe that specialized sui generis
systems like PVP systems are especially prone to early obsolescence be-
cause they tend to embed prevailing technological orthodoxies in their rules
and institutions, but show little capability of adapting when new orthodox-
ies appear and supplant the old. Accordingly, we conclude that the future
role of plant variety protection depends upon the willingness of govern-
ment authorities and others to rethink its basic assumptions, and to consider
responses that range from modest reforms to more ambitious structural
changes.
Our examples are drawn primarily from the application of PVP rules
to cereal crops. The technological changes that we describe have not af-
The Economics of Generating and Maintaining Plant Variety Rights In China 16-24 (Int'l Food Policy
Research. Inst., Environment and Production Technology Division, Discussion Paper No. 100, 2003),
available at http://www.ifpri.org/divs/eptd/dp/papers/eptdp I 00.pdf. India, another jurisdiction of inter-
est, has adopted a PVP system that departs from UPOV principles. See Bonwoo Koo, Carol Nottenburg
& Philip G. Pardey, Plants and Intellectual Property: An International Appraisal, 306 SCIENCE 1295,
1296 (2004) [hereinafter Koo (2004)] (describing the 2001 Indian legislation).
14. Council Regulation 2100/94, Community Plant Variety Rights art. 1, 1994 O.J. (L 227) 1 (EC)
[hereinafter Community PVR Regulation], reprinted with commentary in P.A.C.E. VAN DER KOOIJ,
INTRODUCTION TO THE EC REGULATION ON PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION (1997).
15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27(3)(b), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I C, Results of the
Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 L.L.M. 1197 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english
/docs_e/legale/27-trips.pdf (requiring WTO members to protect plant varieties "either by patents or by
an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof"). While existing forms of UPOV-
compliant PVP systems would undoubtedly qualify as acceptable "sui generis" systems under TRIPS,
Article 27(3)(b) is not limited to UPOV-compliant systems. HELFER, supra note 3, at 38-39.
16. E.g., 2 THE CRUCIBLE II GROUP, SEEDING SOLUTIONS: OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL LAWS
GOVERNING CONTROL OVER GENETIC RESOURCES AND BIOLOGICAL INVENTIONS 135-82 (2001),
available at http://www.bioversityintemational.org/Publications/Pdf/689.pdf (describing detailed
legislative proposals for sui generis PVP systems that generally adopt the UPOV model, but allow for
options that are in some regards more protective than second-generation PVP systems, and in other
regards less protective. The proposals purport to improve on existing PVP systems by giving greater
recognition to farmer contributions and by offering incentives to preserve and promote biodiversity.).
[Vol 82:3
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
fected all crops equally and, hence, the concerns that we raise about threats
of PVP obsolescence are more significant for some crops than for others.
We have organized our study as follows. In Part I, we supply the con-
text for analyzing the obsolescence problem in PVP systems. We place
PVP systems in their intellectual property context, observing that they con-
sist of a complex mixture of copyright, patent, and other concepts. We also
describe the technological context, pointing out that PVP systems origi-
nated at a time when plant breeders conceptualized plants primarily in
terms of observable characteristics (phenotype), but must operate today
within a new paradigm of plant breeding in which breeders can characterize
plants by molecular information (genotype).
In Parts I and III, we show that the old technological paradigm ori-
ented around phenotype is embedded in the substantive rules of PVP sys-
tems, rules that govern both the obtaining of PVP rights (Part II) and the
scope of PVP rights (Part III). Using a range of historical and technical
sources, in addition to sources from legal literature, we show that PVP
systems are infused with phenotype-centered rules, and that attempts to
adapt PVP systems to the paradigm of genotype through concepts such as
the "essentially derived variety" have produced incremental short-run bene-
fits, but are not likely to be satisfactory in the long run.
In Part IV, we construct an alternative model for plant intellectual
property protection that conceives of plants as datasets and employs unfair
competition principles to allocate liability. The model is not intended as a
legislative proposal, but rather as a mechanism for initiating a debate, in
concrete terms, about the premises that underlie existing PVP systems, and,
ultimately, about the best systemic responses to the challenge of obsoles-
cence.
I. PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION: SHIFTING PARADIGMS AND THE
PROSPECTS OF OBSOLESCENCE
In this section, we place PVP systems in their intellectual property and
technological contexts, respectively. We show that (1) PVP systems mix
both classical and unique intellectual property concepts in a scheme that
has generated a confused incentives structure, and (2) PVP systems have
operated against a highly volatile technological backdrop.
20071
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A. The Intellectual Property Paradigm
PVP systems are among the least studied of all intellectual property
regimes. Often likened to patent protection, 17 PVP is better characterized as
a muddle of concepts: quasi-copyright protection that incorporates some
limited patent concepts along with other concepts unique in intellectual
property law.
Structurally, PVP systems are organized along classic lines, employ-
ing (1) a rubric that defines the object of protection (namely, the "variety");
(2) a set of rules governing the grant of protection; (3) a set of rules govern-
ing the scope of protection; and (4) a provision establishing a fixed term
(twenty years from issuance for most varieties). However, PVP systems
diverge substantially from the classic patent and copyright model in ways
that are important to the issue of obsolescence. 18
First, PVP systems employ neither copyright's minimal originality cri-
terion nor patent law's more rigorous novelty-plus-non-obviousness re-
quirements for obtaining protection. 19 PVP systems require that a plant
variety be new, 20 as well as distinct, uniform, and stable (collectively, the
"DUS" criteria). 2 1 Both the variety rubric and the DUS concepts are bound
17. See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 138 (2001)
(PVPA provides "limited patent-like protection for certain sexually reproduced plants"); Asgrow Seed
Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995) (PVPA provides "patent-like protection to novel varieties
of sexually reproduced plants (that is, plants grown from seed) which parallels the protection afforded
asexually reproduced plant varieties (that is, varieties reproduced by propagation or grafting) under [the
plant patent provisions]"); Plant Variety Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agric.
Research and Gen. Legis. of the Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 96th Cong. 1 (1980) (re-
marks of Sen. Donald W. Stewart).
18. For other discussions emphasizing the differences between PVP and patent regimes, see
generally UPOV, INDUSTRIAL PATENTS AND PLANT BREEDERS' RIGHTS-THEIR PROPER FIELDS AND
POSSIBILITIES FOR THEIR DEMARCATION 73-83, UPOV PUB. No. 342(E) (1985); Janis & Kesan (2002),
supra note 3, at 745-52; see also World Intellectual Prop. Org. & Int'l Union for the Prot. of New
Varieties of Plants [WIPO-UPOV], WIPO-UPOV Symposium on the Co-existence of Patents and Plant
Breeder's Rights in the Promotion of Biotechnological Developments, WIPO-UPOV/SYM/02/7 (Oct.
23, 2002), available at http://www.upov.int/en/documents/Symposium2002/pdf/wipo-
upovsym_02_7.pdf (collecting symposium proceedings).
19. For the relevant U.S. patent provisions, see 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (novelty); id. § 103
(nonobviousness). PVP systems also lack patent law's utility and disclosure provisions. See id. § 101
(utility); id. § 112 (disclosure); see also Janis & Kesan (2002), supra note 3, at 748 (explaining the
difference between patent law's requirement for a publicly accessible deposit of biological material to
satisfy § 112 requirements, and the U.S. PVPA's requirement for a sample deposit without any public
access requirement to satisfy the goal of preserving viable seed samples).
20. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)(1) (2000); UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 6.
21. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2402(a)(2)-(4); UPOV (1991), supra note 6, arts. 7-9. In PVP schemes, novelty is
defined solely by reference to the breeder's own acts. For example, when the breeder exploits the
variety more than a year before filing for protection, novelty is destroyed. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)(1)(A);
UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 6(l)(i). Distinctness is measured against the body of "common knowl-
edge" as of the PVP application filing date, which embraces knowledge that resulted from the activities
of third parties. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)(2); UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 7. Collectively, these rules
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up so intimately with underlying technological concepts that PVP systems
are especially susceptible to technological obsolescence, as we will dis-
CUSS. 2 2
Second, rules on the scope of protection track the rules of copyright
scope, but only partially. Copyright infringement rules impose liability for
acts such as unauthorized copying and distributing, but not for the act of
independent creation-copyright infringement presupposes access to the
protected work and the appropriation of some or all elements of it, meas-
ured by assessing similarities between the works. 2 3 PVP infringement pro-
visions 24 function like anti-copying rules: the unauthorized acts triggering
liability (e.g., the unauthorized use of a protected variety for "production"
or "multiplication," 25 selling, conditioning for propagation, or stocking)
presume access to the protected plant material. 26 The Senate report accom-
panying the 1970 U.S. PVPA made explicit this copyright orientation, ob-
serving that the PVPA infringement provision "more resembles copyright
law than patent law" and "infringement is expected almost never to be by
independent work, but by willful reproduction starting from the protected
variety itself."27 In addition, second-generation PVP systems have adopted
provisions that extend PVP protection to "essentially derived varieties"
resemble the patent law rules for novelty in first-to-file jurisdictions-that is, all jurisdictions other than
the United States.
22. See infra PartlI.
23. See, e.g., Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1999) (reciting the standard). By contrast,
patent infringement rules impose liability for any unauthorized exploitation of the claimed invention,
even where the alleged infringer independently created the invention. For example, U.S. patent law
forbids third parties from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention
without authority, 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a), irrespective of whether the infringer independently developed the
infringing subject matter.
24. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a) (defining infringing acts); UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 14(l)(i)-(vii)
(same).
25. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(4) (liability for making unauthorized use of the variety in "producing... a
hybrid or different variety therefrom"); UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 14 (l)(i) (liability for unauthor-
ized "production or reproduction (multiplication)").
26. Relatedly, the infringement provision in § 2541, proscribing unauthorized dispensing of
PVP'd seed, has been construed to require that the alleged infringer have notice that the seed at issue is
protected. See Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Co-operative, Inc., 457 F.3d 1269, 1275 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (stating that the unauthorized dispensing of a protected variety under § 2541(a)(6) triggers liabil-
ity only where the dispenser had notice that the seed it was dispensing was protected under the PVPA; it
is error to construe the provision as a strict-liability provision); Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Sinkers Corp.,
177 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that notice or independent knowledge of protected status
is required).
27. S. REP. No. 91-1138, at 11 (1970). PVP schemes do not say anything explicitly about inde-
pendent creation. If it became feasible for a breeder to constitute a whole variety gene by gene, and the
constituted variety turned out to be identical to a protected variety, the question of independent creation
would come into issue.
2007]
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("EDVs") in some circumstances, 28 provisions that may be likened to de-
rivative-rights provisions in copyright law.29
However, the analogy to copyright scope is imperfect, because copy-
right law's infringement regime coexists with a traditional fair use doc-
trine,30 whereas PVP infringement provisions are subject to different and
more extensive infringement exemptions. Most importantly, PVP systems
allow parties to use PVP-protected seed to breed varieties that compete
commercially with the protected variety. 31 For example, 1991 UPOV-
compliant PVP systems shield from liability "acts done privately and for
non-commercial purposes, ' 32 "acts done for experimental purposes, ' 33 and,
most critically, "acts done for the purpose of breeding other varieties. '34
Copyright fair use insulates many types of uses, but certainly not those that
might potentially reduce or eliminate the market for the copyrighted work.
Patent law's experimental use exemption from infringement is narrower
still, precluding follow-on improvement and other unauthorized exploita-
28. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(c) (relevant substantive provisions); id. § 2401(a)(3) (relevant definitions);
UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 14(5). We discuss EDVs in Part Ill.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000) (derivative works right); id. § 101 (relevant definition of "deriva-
tive work").
30. Id. § 107.
31. Another exemption, albeit of less importance to our discussion, is the so-called "saved seed"
exemption, allowing farmers to harvest and save the seed of protected varieties for replanting in a
subsequent season, subject to limitations. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (implementing the exception); id.
§ 2401(b)(1) (supplying relevant definitions); UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 15(2) (optional excep-
tion); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995) (refusing to shield "brown bag" sales of
saved seed under the saved seed exemption as it stood before being amended to its current form).
32. UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 15(l)(i); accord 7 U.S.C. § 2541(e) ("It shall not be an
infringement of the rights of the owner of a variety to perform any act done privately and for noncom-
mercial purposes.").
33. UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 15(l)(ii).
34. Id. art. 15(l)(iii); accord 7 U.S.C. § 2544 ("The use and reproduction of a protected variety for
plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement of the protection pro-
vided under this chapter."). The U.S. PVPA additionally exempts the unauthorized use of a protected
variety in "developing" (as distinguished from "producing") a new variety. Id. § 2541(a)(4) (distin-
guishing between producing and developing for purposes of imposing liability). The PVPA legislative
history attempts to explain the distinction:
Producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety means that
use of the protected variety in producing the commercial class of seed of a variety constitutes
infringement. Use of the protected variety as one source of germ plasm to breed a novel vari-
ety is permissible. As an example, the use of a protected inbred line of corn to cross it with
another inbred line to produce a hybrid for commercial use, or production of a composite va-
riety which is repeatedly reconstituted for commercial sale by intercrossing a set of seed lines
one of which is protected, shall constitute an infringement. The use of such inbred line for
hybridization with other materials to develop through breeding a novel inbred line as provided
in [the breeding research exemption, 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(4)], however, does not constitute in-
fringement; nor does the production of such new inbred line for the general market constitute
infringement.
H.R. REP. No. 91-1605, at 11 (1970).
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tion of the patented invention that has a commercial nexus.35 As we will
discuss, the presence of such a capacious breeder's exemption exposes PVP
regimes to obsolescence, because the scope of PVP rights may erode sig-
nificantly as a consequence of rapid advances in breeding technologies. 36
This unusual stew of provisions has generated a muddled policy de-
bate over the nature of the incentives that PVP systems provide. In the
U.S., the legislative history of the PVPA contains claims that the Act would
provide patent-like incentives, stimulating private sector investments in the
breeding of improved plant varieties. 37 However, given the jumble of pro-
visions housed in PVP systems, intellectual property theory would predict
that even well-implemented PVP systems would be unlikely to produce ex
ante incentives resembling pure patent incentives. Indeed, theory might just
as likely predict that PVP systems can do no more than encourage the pro-
liferation of additional varieties, irrespective of whether they are improve-
ments over existing varieties-an ambition akin to that of the copyright
system.38 Empirical studies of the PVP system have borne out this ambiva-
lence. At least one early study expressed cautious optimism that PVP sys-
tems could supply meaningful incentives to invest in plant R&D,39 but later
studies have been mixed, some expressing skepticism, especially about
claims that PVP systems would stimulate better yields, 40 others maintain-
35. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Whittemore v. Cutter, 29
F.Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
36. See infra Part Ill.
37. E.g., Plant Variety Protection Act: Hearing on S. 3070 Before the Subcomm. on Agric. Re-
search & Gen. Legis. of the Comm. on Agric. & Forestry, 91st Cong. 49 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Jack
Miller); COMM. ON AGRIC. & FORESTRY, PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. No. 91-1138, at
14 (1970) (views of Department of Agriculture). A similar assertion of Congressional intent appears on
the face of the statute itself. See 7 U.S.C. § 2581 (expressing Congress's intent that the PVPA "afford
adequate encouragement for research, and for marketing when appropriate, to yield for the public the
benefits of new varieties").
38. Advocates of PVP systems appear to suggest that the proliferation of varieties alone is a
substantial justification for PVP protection, even while citing other benefits. E.g., UPOV IMPACT
REPORT, supra note 7, at 26 (presenting pertinent statistics).
39. L.J. BUTLER & B.W. MARION, THE IMPACTS OF PATENT PROTECTION ON THE U.S. SEED
INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC PLANT BREEDING, NORTH CENTRAL REGIONAL RESEARCH PUBLICATION 304
(1985) (expressing cautious optimism that PVP systems might stimulate plant R&D spending); see also
R.K. PERRIN, K.A. KUNNINGS & L.A. IHNEN, SOME EFFECTS OF THE US PLANT VARIETY ACT OF 1970
(1983).
40. A further complication is the differential effectiveness (perceived or real) of PVP systems
across different crops. In some agricultural sectors, PVP systems seem to be considered quite attractive,
while they are scomed in others, without any obvious objective reason for the difference. For statistics
showing the stratification of PVP certificates (and plant patents) by crop, see Koo (2004), supra note
13, at 1296; see also UPOV IMPACT REPORT, supra note 7, at 13, 23 (pointing out that the effectiveness
of PVP systems may vary from crop to crop, and that ineffectiveness with respect to one crop need not
be taken as an indictment of the entire system).
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ing that PVP systems had succeeded for some crops 41 in some jurisdic-
tions.42 And students of the realpolitik of international intellectual property
policy might well dismiss any incentives story, instead ascribing to PVP
systems little more than a role as a political safety valve-a less-protective
alternative to patents in jurisdictions where offering patent protection for
plants is politically unpalatable.
In sum, an examination of PVP systems in their intellectual property
context reveals inconsistencies about the design and goals of PVP systems.
That, coupled with the fact that PVP systems must operate today in a tech-
nological paradigm that the originators of PVP systems could not have
foreseen, suggests that thoughtful reconsideration of the basic premises
underlying PVP systems may be in order. We explain the technological
context next.
B. The Background Technological Paradigms: Phenotype to Genotype
Obsolescence is such a salient issue in plant variety protection because
PVP systems have operated under two distinct technological paradigms of
plant breeding. 43 PVP systems came into being in the 1960s when plant
breeders operated under the paradigm of plant phenotypes, but PVP sys-
tems exist today in a technological milieu that is dominated by the new
paradigm of plant genotypes. 44 Whether PVP systems are capable of being
transformed into effective innovation drivers that respond to the impera-
tives of the genotype age is one of the central questions that we address in
this article.
A brief elaboration on the differences between the paradigms will
place the obsolescence problem in focus. A phenotype is a plant's set of
41. E.g., Anwar Naseem et al., Does Plant Variety Intellectual Property Protection Improve Farm
Productivity? Evidence from Cotton Varieties, 8 AGBIOFORUM 100 (2005) (asserting that U.S. PVP
protection has stimulated the development of cotton varieties and has had a positive impact on cotton
productivity).
42. See UPOV IMPACT REPORT, supra note 7, at § Ill (reporting studies in Argentina, China,
Kenya, Poland, and South Korea in support of claims that PVP systems have led to increases in the
number of varieties, improvements in varieties, and enhancements to the competitiveness of domestic
breeding entities).
43. For our purposes, a paradigm of plant breeding is comprised of the systems, mechanisms, and
techniques for (1) identifying plants (and, in particular, for distinguishing among similar plants) and (2)
exercising control over the characteristics of identified plants as plants are bred from generation to
generation.
44. Maarten Koornneef & Piet Stain, Changing Paradigms in Plant Breeding, 125 PLANT
PHYSIOLOGY 156, 158 (2001) (asserting that "in plant breeding the paradigm has changed from selec-
tion of phenotypes toward selection of genes, either directly or indirectly," and describing relevant
changes in the 1970s to 1990s); Steven D. Tanksley & Susan R. McCouch, Seed Banks and Molecular
Maps: Unlocking Genetic Potential from the Wild, 277 SCIENCE 1063, 1064-65 (1997) (describing the
old paradigm of "looking for the phenotype" and the new paradigm of "looking for the genes").
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observable characteristics, a product of the plant's genes and its interaction
with the environment. 45 A genotype is a plant's entire genetic makeup. 46
The paradigm of phenotype traces back some 10,000 years, when humans
first began to domesticate wild plants.47 Early farmers identified plants
having desirable phenotypic characteristics (e.g., high or stable yield, dis-
ease or insect resistance, non-shattering seeds, desirable appearance, taste,
or other observable physical characteristics) and selectively propagated
those plants. 48 Farmers also experimented with simple cross-fertilization,
attempting to blend characteristics from desirable parents.49 These practices
eventually resulted in the emergence of farmer's varieties ("landraces")-
plant populations that may have been genetically heterogeneous, but pos-
sessed at least enough distinguishing phenotypic features that they could be
told from other plant populations by observation. 50 Farmers began to de-
velop names and naming systems to identify plant populations, implicitly
internalizing both the conceptualization of plant populations as varieties
and the use of phenotypic distinctions to determine what constituted a vari-
ety. 51 These practices-and with them, the paradigm of phenotype-
45. See, e.g., CROP SCI. SOC'Y OF AM., GLOSSARY OF CROP SCIENCE TERMS 52 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter CSSA GLOSSARY] (defining phenotype as the "[o]bservable characteristics, resulting from the
interaction between an organism's genetic makeup and the environment"). Included within a plant's
phenotype are both its morphological characteristics (a reference to visible characteristics and their
evolutionary history) and its physiological characteristics (a reference to the dynamic processes relating
to plant characteristics ). See ROBERT C. KING & WILLIAM D. STANSFIELD, A DICTIONARY OF
GENETICS 254 (6th ed. 2002) (defining morphology).
46. See CCSA GLOSSARY, supra note 45, at 46 (defining genotype as the entire "[g]enetic makeup
of an individual or group").
47. For a brief and accessible overview of the origin of cultivation practices, see MAARTEN J.
CHRISPEELS & DAVID E. SADAVA, PLANTS, GENES AND CROP BIOTECHNOLOGY ch. 13 (2d ed. 2003).
48. That is, they practiced "mass selection." JOHN MILTON POEHLMAN & DAVID ALLEN SLEPER,
BREEDING FIELD CROPS 475 (4th ed. 1995) (defining the phrase as "a system of breeding in which seed
from individuals selected on the basis of phenotype is composited and used to grow the next genera-
tion"). Modem studies of traditional breeding practices have helped plant breeders reconstruct the
narrative of the development of crop cultivation. See, e.g., Nadir Alvarez et al., Farmers' Practices,
Metapopulation Dynamics, and Conservation of Agricultural Biodiversity On-Farm: A Case Study of
Sorghum Among the Duupa in Sub-Sahelian Cameroon, 121 BIOL. CONSERVATION 533 (2005) (modem
study of traditional practices); D. Louette & M. Smale, Farmers' Seed Selection Practices and Tradi-
tional Maize Varieties in Cuzalapa, Mexico, 113 EUPHYTICA 25 (2000) (same).
49. See David A. Cleveland, Daniela Soleri & Steven E. Smith, A Biological Framework for
Understanding Farmers' Plant Breeding, 54 ECON. BOTANY 377 (2000); see also Hugo Perales R.,
S.B. Brush & C.O. Qualset, Dynamic Management of Maize Landraces in Central Mexico, 57 ECON.
BOTANY 21 (2003).
50. See POEHLMAN & SLEPER, supra note 48, at 243 (defining landraces as "[fQarmer-selected
cultivated forms"); see also OTTO H. FRANKEL ET AL., THE CONSERVATION OF PLANT BIODIVERSITY
57 (1995) ("Landraces... 'have a certain genetic integrity. They are recognized morphologically;
farmers have names for them and different landraces are understood to differ in adaptation to soil type,
time of seeding, date of maturity, height, nutritive value, use and other properties."' (quoting Jack R.
Harlan, Our Vanishing Genetic Resources, 188 SCIENCE 618 (1975))).
51. For example, Theophrastus's Enquiry into Plants (circa. 300 B.C.) and Cato's De Agri Cul-
tura (circa 160 B.C.) both listed vernacular names for many cultivated plants. CARY FOWLER & PAT
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persisted well into the twentieth century. Even after the emergence of plant
breeding as a formal scientific discipline in 1900, when breeders rediscov-
ered Mendel's laws of genetic inheritance and began to understand plant
breeding as the work of selecting for genotypes, 52 plant breeders remained
dependent on viewing or measuring plants' phenotypic attributes in select-
ing for desirable agronomic traits.53
The paradigm of phenotype is still relevant: the conceptualization of
plants as varieties based on phenotype is still well entrenched, 54 and plant
breeders still practice selection by phenotype. However, since the 1970s,
advances in biotechnology have allowed plant breeders to move away from
sole reliance on plant phenotypes and towards direct characterization and
manipulation of plant genomes.
The paradigm of genotype involves two principal points of departure.
First, genotyping technologies make it possible to identify and discriminate
among plants directly by their DNA profiles or other molecular characteris-
tics, rather than indirectly by their phenotype alone. Effectively, this is an
MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE LOSS OF GENETIC DIVERSITY 26 (1990) ("Plato's
pupil Theophrastus wrote in his Enquiry into Plants of the many types of wheat which differ in 'color,
size, form, and individual character, and also as regards their capacities in general and especially their
value as food."'); W.T. Steam, Historical Survey of the Naming of Cultivated Plants, 182 ACTA
HORTICULTURAE 19 (1986) (alluding to Cato's work). Archeological evidence points to similar efforts
among peoples in most parts of the world. For one example involving corn, see MARY W. EUBANKS,
ANCIENT ARTISANS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MAIZE (2002) (reporting on descriptions of ears of maize
made on ceramic pots which today allow classification of racial types that were cultivated in A.D. 500).
52. FOWLER (1994), supra note 10, at 24 (noting that prior to 1900 "formal plant breeding was
virtually unknown"). The rediscovery of Mendel's laws resulted from the work of a number of plant
breeders working independently around the turn of the century. For one illustrative account, involving
plant breeder William Spillman's experiments relating to recessive traits in wheat at the dawn of the era
of "scientific" breeding, see Laurie Carlson, Forging His Own Path: William Jasper Spillman and
Progressive Era Breeding and Genetics, 79 AGRIC. HIST. 50 (2005).
53. For example, breeders of hybrid crops have utilized detailed knowledge of pedigrees and
replicated yield trials of an array of early generation FI hybrids to measure the genetic potential of
segregants in breeding populations. However, all of these developments relied upon the plant's physical
appearance and thus remained, at best, indirect approaches to genotypic selection.
54. Indeed, indigenous naming systems based on phenotype still exist for important crops in many
cultures. For example, the Aguarana Jivaro community in northern Peru has developed its own pheno-
typically based description system to discriminate among manioc (cassava root) landraces. See James
Shilts Boster, Selection for Perceptual Distinctiveness: Evidence from Aguaruna Cultivars of Manihot
esculenta, 39 ECON. BOTANY 310 (1985). The literature contains scores of additional examples. See,
e.g., Mauricio R. Bellon & Stephen B. Brush, Keepers of Maize in Chiapas, Mexico, 48 ECON. BOTANY
196 (1994); S.H. Costanza, J.M.J. DeWet & J.R. Harlan, Literature Review and Numerical Taxonomy
of Eragrostis tef (T'ej), 33 ECON. BOTANY 413 (1979) (landraces of T'ef, a native cereal, distinguished
by inflorescence morphology, grain color, time to maturity, and uses); R. Ishikawa et al., Genetic
Resources of Primitive Upland Rice in Laos, 56 ECON. BOTANY 192 (2002); Xu Jianchu et al., Genetic
Diversity in Taro (Colocasia esculenta Schott, Araceae) in China: An Ethnobotanical and Genetic
Approach, 55 ECON. BOTANY 14 (2001); J.J. Sanchez G., M.M. Goodman & J.O. Rawlings, Appropri-
ate Characters for Racial Classification in Maize, 47 ECON. BOTANY 44 (1993) (landraces of Maize in
Mexico and Central and South America identified by characteristics such as the number of leaves per
plant, the kernel width, the ear diameter/length, among others).
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exercise in the genetic "fingerprinting" of plants, a task facilitated by tech-
nological advances in molecular marker systems.5 5 In fact, it is increasingly
possible to reconceptualize plants altogether as genetic datasets, 56 a con-
ceptualization that may diverge radically from the variety rubric.
Second, plant breeders are developing new molecular breeding meth-
odologies-i.e., methodologies that operate at the level of DNA sequences
to directly manipulate the plant's genotype, rather than using phenotype as
the sole reference point.5 7 Techniques such as marker-assisted selection
("MAS") are enhancing (or even displacing) the traditional phenotype-
based breeding methodologies that dominated commercial plant breeding
when PVP systems were designed.58
Moreover, in the course of exploring these techniques, plant breeders
are beginning to discard long-held assumptions about the relationships
between phenotype and genotype. Discoveries in plant genomics have
moved plant breeders away from a "one-gene, one-phenotype mentality"
towards a new appreciation of the complex relationship between genotype
and phenotype, in which plant breeders recognize that plant physiology is
dynamic and responsive to external factors such as environment, and ex-
pect to find intricate gene networks controlling "complex phenotypes." 59
55. We describe molecular markers in more detail infra Part hl.A.
56. Stephen Smith, Genotyping and Sequencing, 7 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 9, 13 (2004) (noting that
the "use of DNA genotypic data to describe varieties de novo" is "possible but controversial").
57. For a brief characterization of molecular breeding strategies, see, for example, Mark Cooper et
al., Genomics, Genetics, and Plant Breeding: A Private Sector Perspective, 44 CROP SCI. 1907, 1907-
08 (2004). Molecular breeding builds upon a number of basic techniques, such as methods for cloning
genes in crop plants and transformation techniques for moving exogenous genes into target plants. For
accessible brief overviews of these basic techniques, see, for example, ADRIAN SLATER, NIGEL W.
SCOTT & MARK R. FOWLER, PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE GENETIC MANIPULATION OF PLANTS chs.
3-4 (2003); Jack M. Widholm, Plant Genetic Modification Technologies, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED
ORGANISMS IN AGRICULTURE: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 275 (Gerald C. Nelson ed., 2001). For repre-
sentative current research on gene cloning in crop plants, see, for example, Li Huang et al., Map-Based
Cloning of Leaf Rust Resistance Gene Lr21 from the Large and Polyploid Genome of Bread Wheat, 164
GENETICS 655 (2003); Nabila Yahiaoui et al., Genome Analysis at Different Ploidy Levels Allows
Cloning of the Powdery Mildew Resistance Gene Pm3b from Hexaploid Wheat, 37 PLANT J. 528
(2004); L. Yan et al., Positional Cloning of the Wheat Vernalization Gene VRN1, 100 PROC. NATL.
ACAD. SCI. USA 6263 (2003). Whole genome sequencing will also assist breeders in identifying genes
associated with phenotypes. See Michael J. Havey, Application of Genomic Technologies to Crop
Plants: Opportunities and Challenges, 44 CROP SCI. 1893 (2004). Researchers have mapped the ge-
nome sequences of Arabidopsis and rice, and projects are underway to map other plant genomes, in-
cluding maize and alfalfa. See Plant Genomes Central, Genome Projects in Progress,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genomes/PLANTS/PlantList.html (last visited May 31, 2007) (listing
plant genome mapping projects).
58. We assess the consequences of MAS infra Part Ill.
59. Justin 0. Borevitz & Joseph R. Ecker, Plant Genomics: The Third Wave, 5 ANN. REV.
GENOMICS HUM. GENETICS 443, 444 (2004). Borevitz and Ecker identify a first wave of plant genom-
ics characterized by single-gene sequencing, primitive markers, and the assumed correlation between
single genes and single discrete phenotypes; a second wave involving whole genome sequencing and
more sophisticated markers, but still directed to "the continued goal of finding genes that correspond to
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In sum, the technological foundation on which PVP systems were de-
signed is being entirely reconstituted. Genotype now predominates over
phenotype. Genotypes are assessed directly, and relationships between
genotype and phenotype are being revealed as more complex than previ-
ously assumed. Each of these developments presents challenges for the
variety concept as used in PVP systems and for the core rules of protection
and scope employed in those systems, as we detail in Parts II and III.
II. OBSOLESCENCE IN RULES OF PROTECTION
In this Part, we assess the potential obsolescence of (1) the concept of
variety (the object of protection in PVP systems) and (2) the DUS criteria
(the principal rules for obtaining PVP protection). We conclude that the
variety concept has outlived its usefulness as an organizational rubric for a
plant intellectual property system, although the concept has become so well
entrenched that the cost of switching away may be difficult to justify. We
conclude that the DUS criteria are based on outmoded concepts and should
be candidates for substantial reform. We applaud near-term efforts to adapt
the DUS criteria to new molecular technologies and seek to draw useful
lessons from those efforts, but we question whether retaining modified
DUS criteria serves well as a long-term solution.
A. Plants as "Varieties" and Plants as Datasets
Although "variety" is the organizing rubric around which PVP sys-
tems are built, very little about the concept can be gleaned from PVP legis-
lative texts.60 Definitions in first-generation PVP legislation-the 1961
UPOV and the 1970 U.S. PVPA-left little room for any independent sig-
nificance for the variety concept in that the primary criteria for qualifying
as a variety were homogeneity and stability (predecessors to the DUS crite-
ria). 61 The official negotiating history of the 1961 UPOV is silent as to the
specific phenotypes"; and a third wave, now emerging, that discards assumptions about simple relation-
ships between phenotype and genotype.
60. But cf Andre Heitz, Plant Variety Protection and Cultivar Names Under the UPOV Conven-
tion, in TAXONOMY OF CULTIVATED PLANTS: THiRD INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 59, 65 (Susyn
Andrews, Alan Leslie & Crinan Alexander eds., 1999) (claiming that the "most prominent achieve-
ment" of UPOV "is perhaps the clarification of the [variety] concept"). As we detail in this section, we
see little evidence supporting this claim.
61. Article 2(2) of UPOV (1961), supra note 4, ("Meaning of Variety") read, "For purposes of this
Convention, the word 'variety' applies to any cultivar, clone, line, stock or hybrid which is capable of
cultivation and which satisfies the provisions of subparagraphs 1(c) [homogeneity] and (d) [stability] of
Article 6." Homogeneity was the predecessor to the current uniformity requirement, one of the DUS
criteria. The definition does not reference the distinctness requirement. Except for the exclusion of
hybrids, the 1970 U.S. PVPA defined variety similarly: "The term 'novel variety' may be represented
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reasons for employing this definition, 62 and the legislative history of the
1970 U.S. PVPA is no more forthcoming. Second-generation PVP legisla-
tion employs a new definition 63 that characterizes "variety" taxonomically
(as a plant grouping at the lowest known rank) and makes some other
changes that further liberalize the concept. 64
These legislative texts show that the variety concept in PVP systems
has operated as a conduit for importing meanings developed elsewhere
by, without limitation, seed, transplants, and plants, and is satisfied if there is [distinctness, uniformity,
and stability]." 7 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1970) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2401 (2000)). A separate
provision exempted from PVP protection "the seeds, plants, or transplants of okra, celery, peppers,
tomatoes, carrots, and cucumbers," for reasons apparently related to the interests of the Campbell's
Soup Company, not to any logical delineation of the variety concept. 7 U.S.C. § 2583 (1970) (repealed
1980); see FOWLER (1994), supra note 10, at 113-14 (recounting the special interest lobbying that led
to the exemption).
62. The history is collected in ACTES DES CONFERENCES INTERNATIONALES POUR LA
PROTECTION DES OBTENTIONS VEGETALES (1974). At the time of the UPOV negotiations, the variety
concept was in use in various national plant registration systems in Europe, , and had been used in a
German proposal for a sui generis intellectual property system in the 1953. HANS NEUMEIER,
SORTENSCHUTZ UND/ODER PATENTSCHUTZ FUR PFLANZENZUCHTUNGEN (1990) (discussing the Ger-
man proposal); Andre Heitz, The History of the UPOV Convention and the Rationale for Plant Breed-
ers' Rights, in 1991 SEMINAR ON THE NATURE AND RATIONALE FOR THE PROTECTION OF PLANT
VARIETIES UNDER THE UPOV CONVENTION 17, 25-27 (1994) [hereinafter Heitz (1994)]. Perhaps this
explains why the UPOV negotiators seemed to take for granted the use of the variety concept as a
foundational rubric.
63. The 1961 UPOV definition of variety was deleted in 1978, and no new definition was inserted
until 1991. Under the 1991 UPOV,
"variety" means a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank,
which grouping, irrespective of whether the conditions for the grant of a breeder's right are
fully met, can be
-defined by the expression of the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or com-
bination of genotypes,
-distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said
characteristics and
-considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated unchanged ....
UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. l(vi) (definitions); see also Community PVR Regulation, supra note
14, art. 5(2) (adopting identical definition); Council Directive 98/44, supra note 9, art. 2(3) (incorporat-
ing by reference the Community definition).
The definition appearing in the current U.S. PVPA differs only cosmetically from the UPOV
1991 definition:
The term "variety" means a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest
known rank, that, without regard to whether the conditions for plant variety protection are
fully met, can be defined by the expression of the characteristics resulting from a given geno-
type or combination of genotypes, distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expres-
sion of at least one characteristic and considered as a unit with regard to the suitability of the
plant grouping for being propagated unchanged. A variety may be represented by seed, trans-
plants, plants, tubers, tissue culture plantlets, and other matter.
7 U.S.C. § 240 1(a)(9) (2000).
64. The new definition sets forth three criteria that are intended to be reminiscent of utility, dis-
tinctness, and stability, respectively, but call for lesser proofs. Barry Greengrass, The 1991 Act of the
UPOV Convention, 13 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 466, 467 (1991) [hereinafter Greengrass (1991)]. The
objective is to ensure that subject matter that is not sufficiently uniform to qualify as a protectable
variety can potentially be considered part of the "common knowledge" for purposes of assessing dis-
tinctness of other subsequent varieties. Id.
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(and, in turn, has influenced the understanding of variety in those other
contexts). Those meanings, it turns out, have as much to do with practical
needs as they do with the facts of biology. As we show in the following
sections, while variety is a concept that has come to have taxonomic and
biological meaning, variety is also a construct that developed as a prag-
matic response to marketplace needs and that came to be employed as a
convenient legal construct to facilitate consensus on intellectual property
rules. Neither motivation would be likely to arise in the same fashion today
in the era of genotyping.
1. "Variety" and Commercial Practicality
The practice of identifying plants as "varieties" owes its origin more
to farmers and practical considerations of commerce than to botanists and
the rigors of science.65 Out of commercial necessity, farmers developed
vernacular naming schemes for their landraces, implicitly relying on a con-
cept of plant varieties understood phenotypically. 66 Obviously the names
signified some consistency, at least in phenotypic qualities-when Cato
published his list of plant names, he surely "could assume that his fellow
Romans knew and could obtain [the plants] under the same name" 67-but it
was a consistency dictated by commercial, not scientific, considerations,
and necessarily founded on intuitive notions about the underlying genetics,
at best.
Scientific conceptions of the plant variety lagged far behind these
pragmatic conceptions. Not until the 1750s, with Linneaus's introduction of
the now-familiar binomial nomenclature (naming genus and species) did
the variety become understood as a subdivision of the species-a third term
65. Relatedly, others have observed that the concept of variety can be understood from many
different perspectives-among them taxonomic, genetic, and economic perspectives. Jos6 Maria Elena
Rossell6, The UPOV Convention- The Concept of Variety and the Technical Criteria of Distinctness,
Uniformity and Stability, in 1991 SEMINAR ON THE NATURE OF AND RATIONALE FOR THE PROTECTION
OF PLANT VARIETIES UNDER THE UPOV CONVENTION, UPOV PUB. No. 727(E), supra note 62, at 57,
57-58.
66. E.g., U. Loscher, Variety Denomination According to Plant Breeders' Rights, 182 ACTA
HORTICULTURAL 59, 59 (1986) (reliable systems of plant variety names had always been "an indispen-
sable factor in trade" because they "gave purchasers the possibility of effectively choosing the variety
they desired").
67. Steam, supra note 51, at 19. In intellectual property terms, vernacular naming practices effec-
tuated a rudimentary trademark scheme for cultivated plants, facilitating market transactions by signify-
ing the origin or consistent agronomic qualities of the plants with which the names were associated. On
the basic functions of trademarks, see, for example, GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY ch. 1 (2004). The importance of trade-
marks in agriculture persisted long past Cato's time. For example, in the late 1800s, producers of the
leading seed corn products normally identified their products by the name of the originator, a place
name, or a descriptive name, like "Reid's Yellow Dent" or "Champion White Pearl." FOWLER (1994),
supra note 10, at 54.
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in the binomial nomenclature. 68 Nearly a century passed before the publica-
tion of the pioneering work on rules for naming cultivated plants,69 and
only in the 1950s, a few years before the drafting of the UPOV, did
horticulturalists agree on a code of international rules for naming cultivated
plants.70
Thus, as of the mid-twentieth century, when conferees began the proc-
ess of drafting the UPOV, the concept of a plant "variety" was still more a
matter of shared informal understanding-more of a response to pragmatic
commercial considerations-than a precise technical concept.71 Moreover,
68. Any standard biology text includes an explanation of the Linnean nomenclature and hierarchy.
See, e.g., WILLIAM K. PURVES ET AL., LIFE: THE SCIENCE OF BIOLOGY 487-89 (5th ed. 1998). See
generally Steam, supra note 51, at 21 (explaining that "before the introduction of binomial nomencla-
ture.., no clear distinction could be made in naming between a species and a variety" but that after-
wards, growers could add a third word "to distinguish varieties within species"). For example, in the
Linnean nomenclature, com is Zea mays, and a com variety B73 (the variety being used in the maize
genome mapping project) would be designated "Zea mays var. B73."
69. The publication is Lois de la Nomenclature Botanique (Laws of Botanical Nomenclature),
published in the mid-1800s by Swedish botanist Alphonse de Candolle. See J. McNeill, Nomenclature
of Cultivated Plants: A Historical Botanical Standpoint, 634 ACTA HORTICULTURAE 29 (2004) (citing
ALPHONSE DE CANDOLLE, LAWS OF BOTANICAL NOMENCLATURE (H.A. Weddell trans., 1868)).
70. Rules pertaining to cultivated plants first appeared as a supplement to the 1905 International
Rules of Botanical Nomenclature. The rules formalized the concept of a variety as a subdivision of the
species. See Steam, supra note 51, at 23 (specifying that "[t]he name of a horticultural 'variety' should
be placed after that of the species to which it belongs and its status should in general be indicated by the
contraction 'var."' (quoting INTERNATIONAL RULES OF BOTANICAL NOMENCLATURE, app VII, R. a
(1935))). For an account of the drafting and adoption of the International Code of Nomenclature for
Cultivated Plants in 1950-53, see id. at 25-27. For the current text of the Code, see C.D. BRICKELL ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL CODE OF NOMENCLATURE FOR CULTIVATED PLANTS (7th ed. 2004), reprinted in
647 ACTA HORTICULTURAE 1 (2004). The Code is a matter of consensus among horticulturalists; it is
not legally binding. For an overview, see C.D. Brickell, The International Code of Nomenclature of
Cultivated Plants-Present and Future Aims and Requirements, 182 ACTA HORTICULTURAE 29 (1986).
The Code adopts the term "cultivar" in preference to "variety," and defines cultivar in pheno-
typic terms, albeit using some criteria that do not appear in PVP definitions of "variety." For example,
the second edition of the Code (1958) defined "cultivar" as a plant grouping that is distinguished by
characters that are "significant for purposes of agriculture, forestry or horticulture ... ," whereas PVP
concepts of protectable varieties do not depend on agronomic significance. P. Trehane, 50 Years of the
International Code of Nomenclature for Cultivated Plants: Future Prospects for the Code, 634 ACTA
HORTICULTURAE 17, 17-18 (2004) (citing the Code definition).
71. FOWLER (1994), supra note 10, at 100 (asserting that "there was no agreement on what consti-
tuted a distinct variety" by the 1930s (citing a historical source)). It is not clear whether Fowler is
speaking of disagreements about what constituted a "variety," what constituted distinctness, or both.
The Secretary of the original UPOV Convention expressed a certain ambivalence about
whether the variety rubric was sufficiently precise. B. Laclaviere, The Convention of Paris of December
2, 1961, for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants and the International Union for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants, 4 INDUS. PROP. 224, 226 (1965) (asserting that "the notion of variety is more
or less precise" as a matter of biology, but acknowledging differences in tolerable levels of genetic
heterogeneity in different countries and across different species, and concluding that "[t]he term 'vari-
ety' can thus be applied to very different categories of plants, according to the species involved and the
States concerned").
Another Secretary of UPOV of more recent tenure put the point more forcefully:
The variety was an abstract concept which had been developed by users of plant varieties
such as agriculturalists and researchers such as botanists and taxonomists to assist in the clas-
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variety took its meaning from plant characteristics that mattered in com-
merce-that is, observable morphological and agronomic characteristics.
Accordingly, from the outset, the concept of variety necessarily bore a
phenotypic bias.
Currently, after nearly a half century of experience under PVP sys-
tems, variety remains as much a commercial concept as a technical one. 72
Efforts in the breeding community to refine the concept have made little
progress in resolving ambiguities 73 and have bound the concept even more
tightly to potentially obsolete phenotypic qualities. 74
2. Variety as a Legal Construct
As commerce in plants expanded, especially in the nineteenth century,
crop-specific growers' organizations developed and attempted to formalize
farmers' lexical practices through codes of nomenclature 75 and, eventually,
sification of plant material. The concept was not a concise one. It had no existence on its
own .... Many rules had been established to define the unit of plant material that would be
considered as a variety, mainly in terms of the mechanism used for reproduction or propaga-
tion.
Barry Greengrass, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Interface between Patent Protection and
Plant Breeder's Rights, WIPO/UPOV/CE/I/4 (1990). For additional commentary on the imprecision of
the variety concept, see Case T 1054/96, Novartis/Transgenic Plant, 1998 O.J. E.P.O. 511 (TBA 1997),
available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t961054epl.pdf ("There is no generally
agreed definition of plant varieties available from scientific textbooks.").
72. The concept has become a fixture in the technical literature. E.g., POEHLMAN & SLEPER, supra
note 48, at 480 (defining variety as a "subdivision of a species" and elaborating that the term refers to "a
group of similar plants that by structural features and performance can be identified from other varieties
within the same species"). Notably, there has been a feedback effect-the legal definition of variety
found in PVP legislation may inform the colloquial understanding of the term in the breeding trade. In
an apparent effort to lend clarity, the CSSA Glossary defines both "variety" and "botanical variety."
CSSA GLOSSARY, supra note 45, at 5 (defining "botanical variety" as "[a]n infraspecific taxon in
botanical nomenclature, below the rank of subspecies"); id. at 37 (defining "variety" in reference to the
DUS criteria).
73. For an example of one potential source of imprecision, see Clement W. Hamilton, Implica-
tions of the Equivalence of Subspecies and Variety, and of the Irrelevance of Forma, 413 ACTA
HORTICULTURAE 57, 57 (1995) (asserting, inter alia, that "[s]ubspecies and varieties are theoretically
and practically indistinguishable, but both are currently used; and the choice relates more often to the
geographic origin of the taxonomist than to the biology of the plants").
74. Important terms include "cultivar" ("cultivated variety"), "strain," "clone," and "line." Usage
of these terms varies. For one set of definitions, see D. Whiting, M. Roll & L. Vickerman, Taxonomic
Classification, COLORADO MASTER GARDNER No. 7.701, http://www.ext.colostate.edu/pubs/garden
/07701.pdf (last visited June 1, 2007) (defining "cultivar" as "a species sub-grouping of cultivated
plants.., displaying unique differences and when reproduced by seeds or cuttings retain its distinguish-
ing characteristics"; "strain" as "a sub-group of cultivar with specific characteristics, like resistance to a
disease or better color"; "clone" as "a sub-group of cultivar derived by asexual propagation (cuttings)";
and "line" as "a sub-group of cultivar propagated by seed"); see also CSSA GLOSSARY, supra note 45,
at 34 (defining "strain" as "[a] selection within a variety lacking clear-cut morphological differences,
but having distinguishing physiological or agronomic qualities such as drought resistance, superior
yield, etc.").
75. See, e.g., Steam, supra note 51, at 22 (referring to a naming code adopted by the American
Pomological Society in the mid-I800s); Freek Vrugtman, The History of Cultivar Name Registration in
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through seed certification procedures. 76 Perhaps inevitably, given their
potential use as protectionist measures, 77 domestic seed certification sys-
tems were eventually codified around the turn of the twentieth century in
the form of state78 and federal seed legislation in the U.S., 79 and in Euro-
pean countries during the same time period.8 0 Given their origins in the
commercial sphere, it is not surprising that these regimes made use of the
variety concept, notwithstanding its scientific imprecision.8'
North America, 182 ACTA HORTICULTURAE 225, 225-26 (1986) (referring to registration programs for
various ornamental flowers--e.g., roses, peonies, and orchids); see also FOWLER (1994), supra note 10,
at 21 (citing NELSON KLOSE, AMERICA'S CROP HERITAGE: THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN PLANT
INTRODUCTION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ch. 6 (1950) (describing farmer development of wheat
varieties in the early 1800s)) (noting an 1859 survey describing 135 varieties of wheat, as well as later
surveys identifying some 7,000 varieties of apples and over 1,300 varieties of strawberries grown in the
U.S.). Notably, notions of the "variety" concept seem to have come earlier to the nursery and omamen-
tals business than to other sectors of the agricultural economy, FOWLER (1994), supra note 10 at 74,
perhaps because breeders believed that they had better control over varietal stability through the use of
asexual breeding practices.
76. That is, procedures that allowed growers to have their products certified if the products were
produced according to association guidelines. Kathy J. Cooke, Expertise, Book Farming, and Govern-
ment Agriculture: The Origins of Agricultural Seed Certification in the United States, 76 AGRIC. HIST.
524 (2002) (detailing certification programs established in the early 1900s among organizations such as
the Indiana Corn Growers' Association, the Minnesota Crop Improvement Association, and others). An
International Crop Improvement Association appeared in 1920, issuing certifications with the avowed
purpose of "ensur[ing] genetic purity and integrity" of plant varieties. Bernard R. Baum, DNA Finger-
printing of Cereal Cultivars for Intellectual Property Rights Protection, in TAXONOMY OF CULTIVATED
PLANTS, supra note 60, at 231, 232 (noting that the Association sought to "prevent confusion in the
marketplace" and to "unify and standardise the seed certification programmes that had been developed
since the turn of the century in many countries").
77. By requiring a plant breeder to have seed registered in order to receive permission to market
the seed in the jurisdiction "the government would be able to require that varieties sold in interstate
commerce be discernibly different and perhaps better than those already being sold." FOWLER (1994),
supra note 10, at 101 (alluding to fears about seed registration schemes, expressed in connection with
the legislative debate over the PVPA).
78. Id. at 81 (noting the 1897 passage of the first U.S. state seed law regulating seed naming and
labeling).
79. A federal "Seed Importation Act" was passed in 1912 and was replaced in 1939, which then
underwent various amendments through the 1950s, incorporating the certification principles that had
been developed by the growers' associations. For the current Federal Seed Act, see 7 U.S.C. §§ 1551-
1611 (2000). For an overview, see Janice M. Strachan, Plant Variety Protection in the USA, in
TAXONOMY OF CULTIVATED PLANTS, supra note 60, at 67, 71; see also BUTLER & MARION, supra note
39, at 10-11 (providing a brief overview); FOWLER (1994), supra note 10, at 101 (briefly noting the
evolution of the federal seed legislation from 1912 onwards); Cooke, supra note 76, at 544 (noting that
after seed certification systems became widespread in the U.S. by the late 1930s, federal seed law
borrowed ideas from those systems).
80. E.g., Heitz (1994), supra note 62, at 24 (noting that proposals for seed certification legislation
began to appear in European countries in the 1920s and 1930s).
81. For the definition of variety as currently employed in the Federal Seed Act, see 7 U.S.C.
§ 1561(a)(12) ("The term 'variety' means a subdivision of a kind which is characterized by growth,
plant, fruit, seed, or other characters by which it can be differentiated from other sorts of the same
kind .... ). It appears likely that the drafters of UPOV assumed that because the variety concept met
the needs of registration systems, it would also serve the needs of a plant intellectual property system,
an assumption that we think is worth reexamining.
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In hindsight, at least, the notion of "variety" may also be understood
as having served an additional function: it has operated as a legal construct
to facilitate exclusions from utility patent protection, and, more broadly, to
mediate between the subject matter provisions of various plant intellectual
property regimes. In Europe, the variety concept has functioned as a way to
express the exclusion from utility patent eligibility embodied in Article
53(b) of the European Patent Convention. 82 It is surely the case that the
framers of both the UPOV and the European Patent Convention were aware
of the use of the variety concept in legal texts, 83 and it is plausible to sup-
pose that the framers concluded that the variety concept could serve as a
politically feasible mechanism for avoiding conflict over patent protection
for plants, a conflict that may have threatened to derail the European Patent
Convention altogether. In the U.S., the variety concept had already been
employed for a similar purpose in the Plant Patent Act of 1930, which ex-
tended to distinct "varieties" that had been asexually reproduced. 84
There are significant points here about the design of plant intellectual
property systems. First, these observations reinforce the point that design-
ing the UPOV system around the variety concept was not an inevitable
consequence of biology. It is predominantly a commercial and even legal
construct that can (and should) be discarded when circumstances change.
Second, they suggest that the desirability of designing an intellectual prop-
erty system around the variety concept may change when the legal envi-
ronment changes. For example, the shift in attitudes about utility patent
protection for plants in the U.S. and Europe affects whether the variety
concept should be retained as a mechanism for defining exclusions from
utility patent protection. To date, the variety concept has not proven very
effective as a mediating concept, either between PVP systems and utility
82. The Convention language provides that European patents shall not be granted "in respect
of... (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or
animals .... Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 53(b), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S.
199, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal epc/pdf/epc_2006_v5_bmen.pdf.
Evidence that the variety concept continues to function as a boundary mechanism comes from
debates in 1991 over the new definition of variety. Concerns were expressed in European patent circles
that the variety concept in UPOV might be construed broadly to cover a plant cell line, simultaneously
broadening the Article 53(b) exclusion from patent protection. Greengrass (1991), supra note 64, at
467.
83. One commentator alludes to the matter, albeit more benignly, observing that some of the
experts who were involved in formulating European patent rules were also involved in the negotiations
that led to UPOV, which ensured "a welcome coordination" between the two efforts. Heitz (1994),
supra note 62, at 32.
84. Currently codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2000). For background, see Cary Fowler, The
Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of its Creation, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
621 (2000).
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patents in Europe, 85 or between plant patents and other intellectual property
regimes in U.S. plant patent law.86 That should cause us to to reexamine
whether the variety concept remains as compelling as the touchstone of
plant intellectual property protection. 87
3. Plants as Datasets
Our review of the origins of the variety concept persuades us that
plant intellectual property systems need not be bound to that concept. Vari-
ety emerged as a term of convenience in the phenotype era; it may become
an encumbrance in the era of genotype. Designers of future plant intellec-
tual property systems will need to consider whether genotype concepts can
be addressed within the existing framework, 88 or whether the variety con-
cept should be discarded altogether as an organizing rubric.
Thus far, second-generation PVP systems have failed to show how the
existing framework organized around the variety concept might be re-
conceptualized to accommodate genotyping data. For example, the cur-
rently prevailing definition of variety refers to genotype, but merely as an
acknowledgment of the genetic basis for phenotypic characteristics. 89 Ef-
85. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Sustainable Agriculture, Patent Rights, and Plant Innovation, 9 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 91, 96-101 (2001) (discussing the ease with which patent lawyers can draft
claims to avoid patent eligibility restrictions).
86. In Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, the alleged infringer argued that "variety"
should be construed to extend only to clones of the patented plant, a meaning that purportedly derived
from the "vernacular sense" of the term, while the plant patent owner argued that "variety" should be
construed more broadly, allegedly consistent with the "technical, taxonomical sense" of the term. 69
F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Finding no clear guidance in the legislative history of the Plant Patent
Act, the court turned to other language in the statute, ultimately concluding that the asexual reproduc-
tion requirement "informs the scope of protection of plant patents and hence directs the meaning of
'variety' in [the Plant Patent Act]"-specifically, directing the meaning in favor of the defendant's
definition. Id. at 1565-67.
87. See supra notes 8-9(citing pertinent U.S. and European decisions); see also Greengrass
(1991), supra note 64, at 467 (providing background on the debate over the elimination of the dual
protection ban from the 1991 UPOV).
88. We are certainly not the first to observe the problem. As one commentator pointed out more
than a decade ago,
In the light of increasing knowledge and possibilities of genetic engineering, it might be nec-
essary to discuss a new definition of the term "variety." It might no longer be sufficient to de-
fine a variety by a set of about 25 morphological characteristics. It would rather be necessary
to define it by its whole genome, represented in the standard sample of the variety.
Georg Fuchs, The UPOV Approach to the Examination of Applications for Protection-Past, Present
and Future, in UPOV SEMINAR ON THE NATURE OF AND RATIONALE FOR THE PROTECTION OF PLANT
VARIETIES UNDER THE UPOV CONVENTION 59, 63 (1991).
89. The definition does refer to genotype, specifying that a plant variety is a plant grouping which
can be defined by "the expression of the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination
of genotypes." UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. l(vi) (emphasis supplied). The term "expression" is
understood as referring to the phenotypic manifestation of genetic qualities. For example, according to
the European Patent Office, "[t]he reference to the expression of the characteristics that results from a
given genotype or combination of genotypes is a reference to the entire constitution of a plant or a set of
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forts to bring genotyping concepts fully within the DUS criteria also have
not yet succeeded, as we discuss in the next section.
It is time for policymakers to recognize the prospect that the variety
concept may become obsolete-or at least unhelpful-when the genotyp-
ing era matures.90 In the future, it may prove more sensible for intellectual
property purposes to conceptualize plants not as varieties, but as genetic
datasets. 91
This new organizing principle builds on a number of technological
developments, most obviously on the development of molecular markers.
In the late 1970s, seed companies began to analyze plant protein data as a
way to discern the underlying genetic content of individual plants, initially
for the purpose of monitoring genetic purity of commercially important
inbreds and hybrids. 92 Effectively, the protein data constituted a first-
generation set of molecular markers for plant breeders. By the early 1980s,
however, tools had become available that allowed the direct manipulation
of DNA relatively easily, leading to the development of another set of mo-
lecular markers: restriction fragment length polymorphisms ("RFLPs"). 93
This second generation of molecular markers has in turn been suc-
ceeded by subsequent generations of markers that rely upon advances in
genetic information." Case G 01/98, Novartis/Transgenic Plant, 2000 O.J. E.P.O. III (Enlarged Bd.
App. 1999) (citing commentary on the EC Regulation on Community Plant Variety Rights).
Nevertheless, one commentator has pointed out that nothing in the text of the definition ex-
pressly precludes interpreting "expression" to include expression in the form of genetic data. Michael S.
Camlin, Plant Cultivar Identification and Registration-The Role for Molecular Techniques, 625 ACTA
HORTICULTURAE 37, 39 (2003) (hereinafter Camlin (2003)] (acknowledging that this is not a main-
stream interpretation).
90. We disagree fundamentally with the proposition that there is little or no connection between
technological evolution and the evolution of PVP systems. Cf Andre Heitz, The History of Plant Vari-
ety Protection, in THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF NEW VARIETIES OF PLANTS 53, 54 (1987) (claiming that "[p]aradoxically-and con-
trary to a quite widely-held opinion-scientific and technical progress in the field of genetics has played
only a minor part in the growth of plant variety protection law").
91. There are many discussions of the analogy between biological and digital information. For one
brief excerpt, see, for example, TIMOTHY M. SWANSON, THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
EXTINCTION 255, 262-63 (1994). Just as plants may be reconceptualized as genotypic databases, others
have recognized that pharmaceuticals can be reconceptualized as information products. See Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 717, 717 (2005) ("Drugs
are information-rich chemicals that in many respects are more akin to other information products (such
as databases) than they are to other chemicals (such as industrial solvents).").
92. Smith, supra note 56, at 10 (explaining that protein characterization provides a fairly high
discrimination among maize inbreds but is less successful for other crops, such as wheat and soybeans).
93. When a DNA sequence is treated with a restriction enzyme, the DNA is cut into fragments
whose lengths are predictable based on the DNA's sequence. When another DNA having a slightly
different sequence (a polymorphism) is treated with the restriction enzyme, the resulting fragments vary
from the predicted lengths. In this way, RFLPs highlight DNA sequence variations. See, e.g., T.A.
BROWN, GENOMES 2, at 130 (2d ed. 2002) (briefly explaining RFLPs).
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DNA amplification (notably the polymerase chain reaction),94 high speed
computing, and automation, among many other fields. Newer generation
molecular markers of interest in plant genotyping include some that require
DNA sequence data95 and others that do not.96 For example, important
current work in plant genomic mapping centers around SNPs. 97 A given
genome is likely to contain hundreds of thousands (or more) SNPs, subsets
of which are likely to provide information about an individual plant's iden-
tity and traits.98
In the long term, molecular marker technologies may render the vari-
ety concept superfluous, an argument that we develop more fully in Section
IV. More immediately, these technologies will impact determinations under
the DUS criteria, as we discuss below.
94. For an accessible explanation of the PCR technique, see, for example, KARL DRLICA,
UNDERSTANDING DNA AND GENE CLONING: A GUIDE FOR THE CURIOUS 153-57 (3d ed. 1997).
95. For example, simple sequence repeats ("SSRs"), also known as microsatellites, and single
nucleotide polymorphisms ("SNPs"). See generally CHRISTOPHER A. CULLIS, PLANT GENOMICS AND
PROTEOMICS 148-52 (2004) (briefly describing types of marker systems).
Since these markers depend upon knowledge of sequence information, their use has depended
upon advancements in sequencing and mapping tools used to elucidate that information. Of the many
relevant advances, one of particular interest in intellectual property circles is the expressed sequence tag
("EST"), a DNA fragment derived from complementary DNA that is capable of uniquely identifying a
location within the genome. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing ESTs). In
addition to completed maps for the genomes of Arabadopsis and rice, plant genomics researchers have
sequenced more than 105,000 wheat ESTs, and hundreds of thousands of com ESTs. See Keith J.
Edwards & David Stevenson, Cereal Genomics, 34 ADVANCES BOTANICAL RES. 1 (2001) (corn ESTs);
Havey, supra note 57 (wheat ESTs).
96. For example, amplified fragment length polymorphisms ("AFLPs") and random amplified
polymorphic DNAs ("RAPDs").
97. The term refers to a variation between individuals of a single nucleotide within a genome.
KING & STANSFIELD, supra note 45, at 363. For an excellent technical review of the discovery and uses
of SNPs in plant breeding, see Antoni Rafalski, Applications of Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms in
Crop Genetics, 5 CURRENT OPINION PLANT BIOLOGY 94 (2002). For recent studies, see Jacqueline
Batley et al., A High-Throughput SNuPE Assay for Genotyping SNPs in the Flanking Regions of Zea
Mays Sequence Tagged Simple Sequence Repeats, I I MOLECULAR BREEDING 111 (2003); Ada Ching
et al., SNP Frequency, Haplotype Structure and Linkage Disequlibrium in Elite Maize Inbred Lines, 3
BMC GENETICS 19 (2002); Xiu-Qiang Huang et al., Genetic Mapping of Three Alleles at the Pm3
Locus Conferring Powdery Mildew Resistance in Common Wheat (Triticum aestivum L.), 47 GENOME
1130 (2004) (describing SNPs for individual alleles in wheat conferring resistance to powdery mildew);
1. Vroh Bi et al., Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms and Insertion-Deletions for Genetic Markers and
Anchoring the Maize Fingerprint Contig Physical Map, 46 CROP SCI. 12 (2006).
98. SNPs rapidly displaced RFLPs in plant genomics, in part because SNPs are amenable to
detection by way of high-throughput, readily automated genomics processes. E.g., BROWN, supra note
93, at 130-33 (explaining how DNA chips and microarray technology, and solution hybridization
techniques, are used to screen for SNPs). SNPs and RFLPs are related, albeit in a limited way. If an
SNP lies in a sequence that contains a restriction site, then treating the sequence with a restriction
enzyme might result in an RFLP, and so the SNP provides little additional information. However, in
any given genome, it is suspected that most SNPs do not lie in sites that would be recognized by restric-
tion enzymes-so SNPs are expected to provide vast amounts of information that RFLPs alone would
not provide. Id.
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B. DUS Testing: Genotype Concepts in Embedded Phenotype-Centered
Rules of Protection
As we have seen, the concept of variety is essentially a legal (or com-
mercial, pragmatic) conclusion about phenotypic characteristics. To reach
that conclusion, PVP authorities apply the DUS rules. Accordingly, the
DUS requirements figure prominently in an assessment of the obsolescence
of PVP systems.
First-generation PVP systems made protection contingent on the vari-
ety satisfying requirements of distinctness, homogeneity, and stability.99
The relevant provisions defined those requirements by reference to "char-
acteristics" or "features"-i.e., phenotype.100 For example, a variety was
distinct if it was "clearly distinguishable by one or more important charac-
teristics" from known varieties, those characteristics typically being "mor-
phological or physiological characteristics."' 10 1
Second-generation PVP systems have retained this focus on pheno-
type by employing the rhetoric of "characteristics" in the definition of vari-
ety' 0 2 and in the modem "DUS" requirements of "distinctness,"
"uniformity," and "stability." For example, the 1991 UPOV requires that a
variety be distinct ("clearly distinguishable from any other variety," where
variety is defined in terms of "characteristics"), sufficiently uniform in its
"relevant characteristics," and stable "in its relevant characteristics."1 03 The
99. For example, UPOV 1961 provided as follows:
(a)... the new variety must be clearly distinguishable by one or more important characteris-
tics from any other variety whose existence is a matter of common knowledge .... A new va-
riety may be defined and distinguished by morphological or physiological characteristics....
(c) The new variety must be sufficiently homogeneous, having regard to the particular fea-
tures of its sexual reproduction or vegetative propagation.
(d) The new variety must be stable in its essential characteristics, that is to say, it must remain
true to its description after repeated reproduction or propagation ....
UPOV (1961), supra note 4, art. 6(1). The 1970 U.S. PVPA employed a similar formulation, but substi-
tuted "uniformity" for homogeneity. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2401(a)(l)-(3) (1970) (current version at 7 U.S.C.
§ 2401 (2000)).
100. UPOV (1961), supra note 4, art 6(1).
101. Id.
102. See supra note 63.
103. Under the 1991 UPOV Act, the DUS criteria are contained in Articles 7-9: "The variety shall
be deemed to be distinct if it is clearly distinguishable from any other variety whose existence is a
matter of common knowledge at the time of the filing of the application." UPOV (1991), supra note 6,
art. 7. "The variety shall be deemed to be uniform if, subject to the variation that may be expected from
the particular features of its propagation, it is sufficiently uniform in its relevant characteristics." Id. art.
8. "The variety shall be deemed to be stable if its relevant characteristics remain unchanged after re-
peated propagation or, in the case of a particular cycle of propagation, at the end of each such cycle."
Id. art. 9.
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U.S. PVPA contains analogous DUS rules 104 and separately defines dis-
tinctness in predominantly phenotypic terms. 105
The rules and practices for implementing the DUS requirements con-
firm that the paradigm of phenotype fully permeates PVP systems. PVP
authorities assess DUS either by reviewing the applicant's data' 06 or by
conducting tests themselves, 107 and the data overwhelmingly comprise
phenotypic observations and measurements. 108 For the distinctness re-
quirement, the information is used to determine whether the candidate vari-
ety differs from reference varieties in at least one characteristic. 109 To
104. The statute provides that a breeder shall be entitled to protection if the variety is both "new," 7
U.S.C. § 2402 (a)(]) (2000), and compliant with the DUS criteria, which specify that a variety must be
(2) distinct, in the sense that the variety is clearly distinguishable from any other variety the
existence of which is publicly known or a matter of common knowledge at the time of the fil-
ing of the application;
(3) uniform, in the sense that any variations are describable, predictable, and commercially
acceptable; and
(4) stable, in the sense that the variety, when reproduced, will remain unchanged with regard
to the essential and distinctive characteristics of the variety with a reasonable degree of reli-
ability commensurate with that of varieties of the same category in which the same breeding
method is employed.
Id. § 2402(a)(2)-(4).
105. Under the relevant "rule of construction,"
The distinctness of one variety from another may be based on one or more identifiable mor-
phological, physiological, or other characteristics (including any characteristics evidenced by
processing or product characteristics, such as milling and baking characteristics in the case of
wheat) with respect to which a difference in genealogy may contribute evidence.
Id. § 2401(b)(5).
106. UPOV IMPACT REPORT, supra note 7, at 28 (summarizing alternatives); UPOV, General
Introduction to the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability and the Development of
Harmonized Descriptions of New Varieties of Plants, 1.1, UPOV Doc. TG/I /3 (Apr. 19, 2002) [here-
inafter UPOV TG/I/3] (explaining that DUS can be assessed either by the applicant or by PVP authori-
ties). In the U.S., the Plant Variety Protection Office requires applicants to submit a statement of
distinctness, supported by evidence where the distinguishing characters are not readily detectable. See
Plant Variety Prot. Office, Guidelines Exhibit B Statement of Distinctness, http://www.ams.usda.gov/
science/PVPO/Forms/GuidelinesB.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
107. This approach predominates in European PVP systems, where varieties also must be tested for
compliance with seed registration regulations. See Camlin (2003), supra note 89, at 40 (noting some
differences between DUS assessments in the context of PVP systems and DUS assessments in the
context of registration); Robert J. Cooke & James C. Reeves, Plant Genetic Resources and Molecular
Markers: Variety Registration in a New Era, I PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 81 (2003) (noting that the
DUS requirements are also relevant to seed registration); Huw Jones et al., The Management of Variety
Reference Collections in Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability Testing of Wheat, 132 EUPHYTICA 175
(2003) (commenting on the connection between variety protection and seed registration in Europe).
108. UPOV's 2002 General Introduction to the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity and
Stability, supra note 106, still speaks in terms of phenotypic characteristics, as we shall explain. See
also Camlin (2003), supra note 89, at 46 (explaining that "[t]he basis for most technical examinations
for the grant [of] Plant Breeders' Rights still remains a comparison of the morphology and physiology
of the component plants of a candidate cultivar with appropriate reference cultivars" to assess DUS).
109. This is always true for "qualitative" characteristics, but true only sometimes for "quantitative"
and "pseudo-quantitative" characteristics. Qualitative characteristics describe an independent state-
e.g., sex of the plant-not a point on a continuous range. In contrast, quantitative characteristics do
describe a point on a continuous range--e.g., whether a stem is short, medium, long, very long. Pseudo-
qualitative characteristics are those that are only partly describable by continuous variation across a
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apply such a standard, one must know which characteristics are deemed
relevant and which methodologies are deemed appropriate for assessing
differences. As to the identification of relevant characteristics, UPOV has
developed guidelines for some 250 species, each listing phenotypic charac-
teristics (typically fifteen to fifty for each species) that are deemed perti-
nent to distinctness assessments.I 10 The guidelines articulate characteristics
in subtle and minute detail."' As to the methodologies, although UPOV
documents specify a variety of statistical methods for use in some circum-
stances, 112 in many circumstances distinctness assessments are performed
visually, 113 perhaps over more than one growing cycle. 114
PVP authorities also assess uniformity and stability by phenotypic cri-
teria. The uniformity requirement calls for plants of the candidate variety to
be no more likely to display phenotypic variation ("off-types") than a set of
comparable reference varieties. 115 For self-pollinated and vegetatively
range-e.g., leaf shape. UPOV TG/1/3, supra note 106, 4.4. A difference in expression of at least one
qualitative characteristic confers distinctness; a difference in pseudo-qualitative characteristics will
have an effect specified in the relevant guidelines for the species; the effect of differences in quantita-
tive characteristics is complex, and depends upon the methodology used and the features of the variety
at issue. Id. 5.3.3.2.
110. Cooke & Reeves, supra note 107, at 82 (reporting that UPOV has produced guidelines for
DUS testing in over 250 species); Fuchs, supra note 88, at 5 (referring to UPOV's efforts to establish
technical guidelines for DUS examination); see also Rossell6, supra note 65, at 62-69 (describing the
typical contents of test guidelines); F.A. van Eeuwijk & C.P. Baril, Conceptual and Statistical Issues
Related to the Use of Molecular Markers for Distinctness and Essential Derivation, 546 ACTA
HORTICULTURAE 35, 37 (2001) (noting that technical guidelines typically specify 15-50 characteristics
for comparison).
111. Some are, quite literally, hair-splitting. See, e.g., UPOV, Guidelines for the Conduct of Tests
for Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability: Barley, at 11-15, UPOV Doc. TG/19/10 (Nov. 4, 1994)
(listing twenty-nine characteristics for barley, including such seemingly obscure details as the Rachilla
hair type (short or long); the ear attitude (erect, semi-erect, horizontal, semi-recurved, recurved), and the
intensity of the anthocyanin coloration of the tips of the awns).
112. E.g., UPOV TG/1/3, supra note 106, 5.5.3 (providing an overview of statistical methods
usable for assessing measured characteristics).
113. Id. 5.4.1; Cooke & Reeves, supra note 107, at 82 (noting that DUS testing has traditionally
relied upon direct phenotypic observation); van Eeuwijk & Baril, supra note 110, at 38 (visual assess-
ments of distinctness commonplace for "genetically homogeneous" varieties). These visual assessments
can be so intricate that authorities may need to resort to computer image analysis. See, e.g., David
Warren, Image Analysis in Chrysanthemum DUS Testing, 25 COMPUTERS & ELECTRONICS AGRIC. 213,
214 (2000) (proposing a software-based system for conducting morphological analysis of chrysanthe-
mums, which are described by sixty-four characters, fifteen of which alone relate to leaf shape, leaf
color, and leaf size).
114. van Eeuwijk & Baril, supra note 110, at 37. See generally UPOV, Designing the DUS Tests,
UPOV Doc. UPOV/DATA/BEI/04/4 (May 19, 2004) (providing details on conducting grow-out tests
for DUS evaluations).
115. UPOV, Examining Uniformity, 3, UPOV Doc. UPOV/DATA/BEI/04/8 (May 25, 2004)
[hereinafter UPOV/DATA/BEI/04/8]. See generally UPOV TG/1/3, supra note 106, ch. 6. The lan-
guage of the uniformity requirement specifies that a variety be "sufficiently uniform in its relevant
characteristics," and UPOV practices hold that "relevant" characteristics for uniformity include at least
those characteristics used for distinctness. Id. 6.2.
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propagated crops, most uniformity assessments are done visually.' 16 Stabil-
ity-the requirement that a variety retain its distinct characteristics through
a given number of propagation cycles-has little independent significance
in current practice; stability is generally found when uniformity is estab-
lished. 117
The inadequacy of phenotype-centered DUS requirements is becom-
ing more and more evident. Concerns are wide-ranging: (1) phenotypic
observation is subjective118 and costly, 119 (2) phenotypic characteristics are
dependent on environmental interactions-a matter which may become
more serious as PVP schemes begin to operate in new countries having
climates that differ widely from traditional PVP jurisdictions, 120 and (3)
distinctness assessments are becoming even more subtle as reference col-
lections become larger and as marketplace pressures drive breeders towards
incorporating very similar traits in phenotypically similar plants 12' that
may be genotypically quite different. 122 Distinctness testing in soybean
varieties provides a good illustration. Characteristics relevant to distinct-
ness in soybeans have included flower color, "leaf shape, growth habit,
Uniformity is highly plant-specific. Variations that are considered allowable for, say, a cross-
pollinated variety may not be allowable for a self-pollinated variety. UPOV/DATA/BEI/04/8, supra,
3; Jutta Rasmussen, The UPOV Convention-The Concept of Variety and the Technical Criteria of
Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability, in UPOV SEMINAR ON THE NATURE OF AND RATIONALE FOR
THE PROTECTION OF PLANT VARIETIES UNDER THE UPOV CONVENTION, supra note 88, at 51.
116. UPOV TG/1/3, supra note 106, 6.4.1.1. The idea is that these crops exhibit little variation, so
off-types are relatively easy to spot visually.
117. Id. 7.3.1.1 ("[E]xperience has demonstrated that, for many types of variety, when a variety
has been shown to be uniform, it can also be considered to be stable."); Rasmussen, supra note 115, at
57.
118. E.g., Joelle Lallem, New Techniques and Equipment for Variety Testing, in UPOV REGIONAL
SEMINAR ON THE NATURE OF AND RATIONALE FOR THE PROTECTION OF PLANT VARIETIES UNDER THE
UPOV CONVENTION 49, UPOV PUB. NO. 722(E) 49 (1993) (noting "the subjectivity of scoring charac-
teristics such as foliage colour or plant growth habit").
119. E.g., G. Nuel, C. Baril & S. Robin, Varietal Distinctness Assisted by Molecular Markers: A
Methodological Approach, 546 ACTA HORTICULTURAE 65 (2001). The need for multiple grow-outs is
the main source of expense.
120. E.g., Fuchs, supra note 88, at 62 ("The morphological characteristics commonly used for
examination have the disadvantage that most of them are more or less susceptible to environmental
conditions."); V. Lombard et al., Genetic Relationships and Fingerprinting of Rapeseed Cultivars by
AFLP: Consequences for Varietal Registration, 40 CROP SCI. 1417 (2000) (noting the difficulty of
distinguishing between intrinsic characteristics and those resulting from environmental stresses, espe-
cially over a limited number of grow-out tests); see also Camlin (2003), supra note 89, at 38 (pointing
out that the problem of environmental interaction is likely to worsen with the expansion of PVP regimes
into new jurisdictions).
121. Camlin (2003), supra note 89, at 38 (mentioning larger reference collections); Lombard et al.,
supra note 120, at 1417. Camlin also observes that phenotype-centered rules of the PVP system may
not cohere with rules of the utility patent system, which are not framed by phenotype (and which stand
to become the principal vehicle for the products of plant biotechnology). Camlin (2003), supra note 89,
at 37. This observation is particularly important for assessing essentially derived varieties, which we
take up infra Part 111.
122. See references cited infra note 126.
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maturity, and other conventional morphological and disease resistance
traits." 123 Assessing differences in these characteristics is especially diffi-
cult because most commercial soybean products "arise from hybridization
between members of an elite group of genotypes, and the amount of genetic
variability between these cultivars is small."' 124 In addition, it has been
noted that these distinctions have become more difficult to draw as the
number of varieties has increased.125
Even more fundamentally, a failure of phenotypic data to show dis-
tinctness may demonstrate a limitation of the methodology rather than a
lack of genotypic difference. Today it is well established that phenotypic
comparisons using traits that were specifically selected by UPOV for DUS
purposes do not necessarily provide reliable estimates of genetic distan-
ce 126 or of agronomic performance potential.127 Varieties can be similar in
their PVP characteristics and yet still represent genetically different germ-
plasm.128 The genetic basis of phenotypic traits is proving to be more com-
plex than previously assumed, with some traits of interest proving to be
multigenic. 129
PVP experts have recognized these problems for at least a decade.
During that same time, molecular techniques that facilitate direct assess-
123. N. Diwan & P.B. Cregan, Automatic Sizing of Fluorescent-Labeled Single Sequence Repeat
(SSR) Markers to Assay Genetic Variation in Soybean, 95 THEORETICAL APPLIED GENETICS 723, 724
(1997).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Judith Burstin & Alain Charcosset, Relationship Between Phenotypic and Marker Distances:
Theoretical and Experimental Investigations, 79 HEREDITY 477 (1997); C. Dillmarm et al., Comparison
of RFLP and Morphological Distances Between Maize Zea mays L. Inbred Lines. Consequences for
Germplasm Protection Purposes, 95 THEORETICAL APPLIED GENETICS 92 (1997); see also C. Rebourg,
B. Gouesnard & A. Charcosset, Large Scale Molecular Analysis of Traditional European Maize Popu-
lations. Relationships with Morphological Variation, 86 HEREDITY 574 (2001). These references point
out that phenotypic similarity may, for example, result from convergent evolution, rather than reflecting
similarity in genotype. One illustration is the difficulty that breeders have long faced in maintaining
uniformity of maize inbreds based solely on phenotypic criteria.
127. Instead, agronomic utility must be assessed using other types of phenotypic data that are
predictive of agronomic performance, or marker data that are either agronomically useful or that dem-
onstrate a close genetic or pedigree relationship to varieties of demonstrated agronomic utility.
128. E.g., Tanksley and McCouch, supra note 44, at 1063 (noting that a parent judged to be pheno-
typically inferior might contribute superior alleles to its progeny). Approaches to breeding that rely
solely upon phenotype reduce the effectiveness and limit the potential that could otherwise be achieved
by plant breeding. While breeders have developed increasingly sophisticated procedures to make selec-
tion a more efficient process (for example, breeders now document and track pedigrees, make con-
trolled pollinations using identified parents, and conduct replicated field trials and statistical analyses to
reduce as much as possible the clouding effects of the environment), these procedures are still based
upon direct selection of the phenotype (including yield data) acting as the surrogate to accomplish
selection on the genotype.
129. This fact also creates problems for the enforceable scope of PVP rights, as we discuss infra
Part II (concerning EDVs).
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ments of genotype have developed rapidly, leading many observers to con-
sider whether molecular techniques could be used for DUS assessments,
potentially weaning the PVP system away from reliance on phenotype.
As a technical matter, the use of molecular techniques for DUS is pos-
sible, but many questions remain about implementation. The technical lit-
erature includes numerous studies on the use of molecular marker data for
DUS testing. Early marker systems such as isozymes and seed storage pro-
teins, 130 along with various electrophoretic methods, 131 were reported to be
useful for DUS testing over a decade ago. More recent studies employ
RAPDs, 132 AFLPs 133 and more current systems such as SSRs134 STMS
markers, 135 and SNPs. 136 In general, the technical literature expresses en-
130. Cooke & Reeves, supra note 107, at 83 (noting that isozymes and markers indicating seed
storage proteins appear in the UPOV DUS testing guidelines for some crops (including, e.g., wheat and
maize), but only as additional characteristics whose use is limited to prescribed circumstances).
131. M.S. Camlin, Possible Future Roles for Molecular Techniques in the Identification and Regis-
tration of New Plant Cultivars, 546 ACTA HORTICULTURAE 289, 292 (2001) (noting that UPOV ac-
corded electrophoretic methods a limited role in DUS guidelines for wheat and barley in 1994); Jones et
al., supra note 107, at 183 (recommending that electrophoretic characteristics be given equal stature
with morphological characteristics to allow better management of reference collections).
132. E.g., David Lee et al., DNA Profiling and Plant Variety Registration: 1. The Use of Random
Amplified DNA Polymorphisms to Discriminate Between Varieties of Oilseed Rape, 17
ELECTROPHORESIS 261 (1996) (use of RAPDs for DUS testing).
133. John R. Law et al., DNA Profiling and Plant Registration. III: The Statistical Assessment of
Distinctness in Wheat Using Amplified Fragment Length Polymorphisms, 102 EUPHYTICA 335 (1998)
(advocating the use of AFLP markers for distinctness testing in wheat, though noting that further re-
search was needed to determine whether AFLPs would work properly for uniformity testing); Lombard
et al., supra note 120, at 1424 (advocating the use of AFLP molecular markers for DUS testing in
rapeseed).
134. Cooke & Reeves, supra note 107, at 83 (reporting on an EU-funded project that produced a
standardized set of SSR markers for wheat and tomato varieties); Diwan & Cregan, supra note 123, at
729-30 (reporting that the USPVPO had already begun accepting "SSR allelic profiles as supporting
evidence for the uniqueness of a new cultivar"); S. Giancola et al., Feasibility of Integration of Molecu-
lar Markers and Morphological Descriptors in a Real Case Study of a Plant Variety Protection System
for Soybean, 127 EUPHYTICA 95 (2002) (advocating the use of SSR markers ombined with morphologi-
cal characters for soybeans). Systems like that described in Diwan & Cregan still rely on morphological
data as well.
135. G. Corbett et al., Identification of Potato Varieties by DNA Profiling, 546 ACTA
HORTICULTURAE 387 (2001) (advocating the use of STMS-sequence tagged microsatellite analysis-
for identifying potato varieties); N. Nandakumar et al., Molecular Fingerprinting of Hybrids and As-
sessment of Genetic Purity of Hybrid Seeds in Rice Using Microsatellite Markers, 136 EUPHYTICA 257,
260 (2004) (asserting that in the commercialization of hybrid rice in India, "the molecular fingerprinting
of the hybrids and their parental lines assumes utmost importance for protecting the Plant Breeders'
Rights (PBR)" and advocating the use of STMS markers for the task); R.K. Singh et al., Suitability of
Mapped Sequence Tagged Microsatellite Site Markers for Establishing Distinctness, Uniformity and
Stability in Aromatic Rice, 135 EUPHYTICA 135 (2004) (STMS markers for DUS testing in Basmati rice
varieties); B. Vosman et al., Standardization and Application of Microsatellite Markers for Variety
Identification in Tomato and Wheat, 546 ACTA HORTICULTURAE 307 (2001) (cautiously supportive);
see also UPOV Off. of the Union, Progress Report of the Technical Committee, the Technical Working
Parties and the Working Group on Biochemical and Molecular Techniques and DNA-Profiling in
Particular, I 11, UPOV Doc. C/36/10 (Aug. 13, 2002) [hereinafter UPOV C/36/10] (asserting that
STMS markers are the most widely used for plant variety characterization).
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thusiasm about the potential uses of molecular data for DUS, but also con-
tains an undertone of caution about implementation complexities. Among
many cited obstacles are concerns over standardization, 137 the appropriate
choice of molecular marker systems, and the development of detailed tech-
nical protocols for employing those systems. Some conclude that molecular
data should be used only as a supplement to phenotypic data. 138 Any large-
scale program to adapt existing DUS examination to the paradigm of geno-
type is likely to present significant administrative costs.
The policy consequences of attempting to adapt current DUS stan-
dards to the paradigm of genotype are likewise mixed. The effect of substi-
tuting molecular data for phenotypic assessments of DUS is indeterminate.
There are concerns that the use of molecular data might result in a lower
threshold of distinctness if molecular data reveal many new bases for dis-
tinctness that are not readily discernable from phenotypic observation. 139
However, there are also concerns that the use of molecular data might drive
the threshold for uniformity higher if molecular data reveal variations that
present issues about the sufficiency of uniformity (issues that would have
gone undetected in a regime of phenotypic assessments). 140
In keeping with these ambivalent consequences, major stakeholders in
the PVP system have acknowledged the potential utility of molecular data-
sets, but have expressed great caution about incorporating them into as-
sessments of DUS. In 1993, UPOV established a Working Group on
136. See supra note 97 (describing SNPs and their use in plant breeding).
137. For example, on the difficulties of standardizing marker data for uniformity assessments, see
UPOV Off. of the Union, Progress Report of the Technical Committee, the Technical Working Parties
and the Working Group on Biochemical and Molecular Techniques, and DNA-Profiling in Particular,
21-22, UPOV Doe. C/34/10 (July 24, 2000) [hereinafter UPOV C/34/10] (observing that different
assessment methodologies will be required for different marker sets, but proceeding to report that
experts expressed optimism that uniformity could be measured effectively using molecular methods);
R.J. Cooke et al., Assessment of the Uniformity of Wheat and Tomato Varieties at DNA Microsatellite
Loci, 132 EUPHYTICA 331, 339 (2003) (explaining some of the complexities in standardizing marker
data to be used for DUS testing, but still expressing optimism about the idea of using such data; focus-
ing on the uniformity criterion).
138. E.g., V. Lombard et al., Genetic Distance Estimators Based on Molecular Data for Plant
Registration and Protection: A Review, 546 ACTA HORTICULTURAE 55, 62 (2001); see also G.P. Bernet
et al., Applicability of Molecular Markers in the Context of Protection of New Varieties of Cucumber,
122 PLANT BREEDING 146, 151 (2003) (questioning the feasibility of using molecular markers alone for
DUS testing in cucumbers and suggesting that marker data could be useful as a supplement in arranging
field trials).
139. If distinctness becomes easier to establish, protection may be easier to obtain, but the scope of
protection may be eroded. It may be easier for accused infringers to show that their variety is distin-
guishable from the protected variety, thus avoiding infringement liability. See infra Part Ill (dealing
with the scope of PVP rights in the genotype era).
140. Variations in genotypic data introduced in the ordinary course of breeding would have to be
managed more carefully, lest the variety be deemed not sufficiently uniform. E.g., Smith, supra note 56,
at 13.
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Biochemical and Molecular Techniques (the "BMT" group) that has stud-
ied the use of molecular techniques for DUS testing. 14 1 At present, how-
ever, it seems clear that the BMT's work will not result in a substantial
reduction in the role that phenotypic determinations play in DUS assess-
ments. The BMT group considered three options for incorporating molecu-
lar data into DUS determinations: (1) using molecular data only as a
predictor of a specific phenotypic characteristic; (2) using molecular data
as the basis for calculating quantitative thresholds based on genetic dis-
tance that could be included in DUS assessments; and (3) devising a new
system--e.g., one that would substitute molecular marker data for pheno-
typic characteristics, although the proposal envisioned that conformity as
measured by the molecular characteristics would be supplemented by
grow-out tests. 142 The group concluded that options (1) and (2) were ac-
ceptable, but were unable to come to consensus on option (3). 143 The seed
industry has expressed both cautious support for aspects of BMT's work
and resistance to it,144 pointing out concerns about the complexity of rela-
tionships between phenotype and genotype, 14 5 alterations in the standards
for distinctness and uniformity, 146 and the prospect of jeopardizing the
scope of PVP protection, 147 and advocating a transition period should the
decision be made to implement molecular data in DUS testing.14 8
141. E.g., Camlin (2003), supra note 89, at 41.
142. UPOV C/36/10, supra note 135, 114 (describing the three options); Camlin (2003), supra
note 89, at 44 (same).
143. Camlin (2003), supra note 89, at 44 (noting that as to Option 3, the BMT Review Group
expressed concerns that "it might be possible to use a limitless number of markers to find differences
between varieties" and that "differences would be found at the genetic level which were not reflected in
morphological characteristics"); cf UPOV Off. of the Union, Progress Report of the Technical Com-
mittee, the Technical Working Parties and the Working Group on Biochemical and Molecular Tech-
niques, and DNA-Profiling in Particular, add. E 9, UPOV C/38/10 (Oct. 18, 2004) (agreeing that "it
would be useful" to prepare a guidance document "on the planning of databases for molecular data
based on different types of markers").
144. See, e.g., Int'l Seed Fed'n, ISF View on Intellectual Property 4 (June 2003) [hereinafter ISF
View (June 2003)], available at http://www.worldseed.org/pdf/ISF-View-onIntellectual-Property.pdf
("ISF considers that DUS testing should continue to be based on phenotypic characteristics."); see also
ASSINSEL, Position Paper on DUS Testing: Phenotype vs. Genotype (May 2000) [hereinafter
ASSINSEL (2000)], available at http://www.worldseed.org/Position-papers/PhenotypeGenotypee.htm
(same).
145. ISF View (June 2003), supra note 144, at 5 ("DNA marker profiles are not yet predictive of
most phenotypic characteristics due to a lack of genetic linkage information or to the relatively complex
genetic control of many phenotypic traits.").
146. Id. (referring to a "level of uniformity" that is different from the "variability in varieties which
have satisfied current DUS standards").
147. In particular, ISF notes "[t]he risk of decreasing the minimum distance to an extreme" and
expresses concerns over differentiating "between the concepts of distinctness and essential derivation
when both of them are assessed using molecular markers" Id. We take up scope of protection issues in
Part Ill.
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All but absent in this debate is a recognition of the larger question:
whether DUS should remain the "gold standard" for obtaining PVP
rights. 149 Policymakers should recognize that (1) the DUS criteria are es-
sentially artifacts of the paradigm of phenotype, rather than instrumental
criteria well calibrated to stimulate innovation in plant breeding, and (2) the
difficulties involved in incorporating genotype concepts into DUS rules
reflect the shortcoming of the DUS rules, not merely the shortcomings of
genotyping techniques as they are currently practiced. While first-
generation PVP systems defined distinctness in terms of "important" char-
acteristics, 150 PVP authorities quickly dispensed with the notion that "im-
portance" required a showing of agronomic superiority, and ultimately
eliminated the language from the distinctness standard to make clear that
distinctness involved no inquiry into agronomic merit. 151 Current genera-
tion DUS requirements at their best can only seek to ensure that protected
varieties are distinct (and uniform and stable) in their technical, phenotypic
Sentiments similar to those expressed in the 2003 ISF paper also appeared in an ASSINSEL
position paper published in May 2000. Without ruling out the possibility of future DUS testing based on
genotypic data, ASSINSEL concluded "that DUS testing should continue to be based on phenotypic
characteristics," and offered the following rationales: (1) "It is preferable as far as possible that D, U
and S can be recognized in the field"; (2) a phenotypic approach to DUS is more consistent with the
1991 UPOV definition, which refers to "expression" of the characteristics resulting from a given geno-
type; and (3) "ASSINSEL considers that the use of molecular markers for DUS testing could decrease
the scope of protection when the goal, in fact, should be to strengthen protection." ASSINSEL (2000),
supra note 144.
148. ISF View (June 2003), supra note 144, at 5; see also Camlin (2003), supra note 89, at 45
(observing that PVP authorities may need to implement transition periods or rules that combine molecu-
lar and phenotypic characteristics).
149. As Cooke and Reeves have put it,
No attempt is being made to question whether this morphological 'Gold Standard' was, or is
now, anything more than a pragmatic approach to infra-specific taxonomy adopted in the past
because no other cost-effective tools were available. If the purpose of DUS testing is simply
to find some way by which to declare two varieties different regardless of the biological
meaning of that difference, then the current system is entirely satisfactory. If, on the other
hand, PBR is a means of rewarding the outcome of a scientifically based plant breeding exer-
cise by establishing an effective 'zone of protection' around a variety, based on relatedness
and taking associations between varieties into account, then the system should be based on
metrics which reflect these associations.
Cooke & Reeves, supra note 107, at 84.
150. See supra note 99 and accompanying text for the relevant language contained in 1961 UPOV
Art. 6(l)(a). The initial version of the PVPA did not include the "importance" criterion, instead defining
distinctness in terms of "identifiable ... characteristics." 7 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(1) (1970) (current version
at 7 U.S.C. § 2401 (2000)).
151. Greengrass (1991), supra note 64, at 468; see also IPGRI, KEY QUESTIONS FOR DECISION-
MAKERS: PROTECTION OF PLANT VARIETIES UNDER THE WTO AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 14 (1999) (stating that the "importance" criterion in
1961 and 1978 UPOV did not require showing of commercial merit). Because agronomic merit varies
so widely depending upon climate, economics, and other factors, UPOV authorities perceived an agro-
nomic importance factor for distinctness to be untenable. Greengrass (1991), supra note 64, at 468.
Phenotypic characteristics used for DUS determinations might be connected to agronomic merit, but the
DUS criteria are not designed to guarantee agronomic merit.
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sense, not in any sense of agronomic improvement. 152 If improvement was
formerly the objective, then PVP systems, by elevating the DUS criteria to
prominence, have long ago become unhinged from that initial objective. 153
The design of the DUS criteria virtually guarantees that PVP systems can
play no more than a meager role in the improvement of plant varieties, 154
and this fact should call into question the heavy reliance on DUS require-
ments in existing PVP systems and the massive administrative expense of
implementing those requirements, especially in European practice.155
PVP authorities should take greater heed of the profound lack of fit
between the DUS rules and the paradigm of genotype. It is likely that the
DUS criteria have outlived their usefulness. Adopted at a time when geno-
typic data did not exist, the DUS criteria supplied a mechanism-albeit an
essentially artificial one not necessarily linked to agronomic merit-for
distinguishing among plant varieties. But the criteria have outlived their
152. UPOV TG/1/3, supra note 106, 4.2.2. Nor is it realistic to suppose that the existing DUS
scheme could simply be adapted to become a guarantor of agronomic importance. Quite to the contrary,
with the extension of PVP systems to the diverse climates of the developing world, it is more unrealistic
than ever to suppose that a unified notion of agronomic importance can be imposed.
153. There is a legendary 1920s-era anecdote on the divergence of phenotype and meritorious
agronomic traits: a young Henry Wallace exploded the myth that certain visual characteristics of com
ears correlated with yield-and brought an end to popular "com shows." See Merle T. Jenkins, 1936
Corn Improvement, in USDA YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE 455 (1937) (explaining that in the corn
show era, the ear was "regarded as a thing of beauty" and that farmers "more or less assumed that the
characteristics associated with its beauty were of value from the standpoint of production .... ); see
also H. A. Wallace, What is in the Corn Judge's Mind?, 15 J. AMER. SOC. AGRONOMY 300 (1923).
Wallace would go on to master the production of hybrid com, found the Pioneer Hi-Bred company (still
the world's leading producer of hybrid corn seed), and occupy a central place in American agriculture
in the twentieth century through his work as Secretary of Agriculture and Vice-President to Franklin
Delano Roosevelt. See JOHN C. CULVER & JOHN HYDE, AMERICAN DREAMER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
HENRY A. WALLACE (2000).
154. Notwithstanding recent claims that attribute variety improvement to the operation of PVP
systems, UPOV IMPACT REPORT, supra note 7, § III, it would seem that the DUS requirements are
likely no more capable of stimulating the development of "improved" plant varieties than the copyright
laws are capable of spurring the creation of "improved" novels. Instead, the DUS requirements, at best,
perform a role comparable to the originality requirement in copyright law. Consider the doctrine of
originality in copyright law requires a showing that the putative author indeed did create independently
the work at issue (that is, that the putative author indeed merits recognition as an "author") and that the
work exhibits a trifling amount of creativity. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S.
340, 345 (1991). This latter requirement is minimal; questions of the level of creativity are relevant, if
at all, to considerations of scope. Accordingly, originality can serve the purpose of copyright law inso-
far as the purpose is to stimulate the proliferation of works, without regard to their artistic merit. Simi-
larly, the best that can be expected of the DUS requirements is that they may stimulate the proliferation
of plant varieties, without regard for the merits of those varieties. If this proliferation is independently
of value-for example on the grounds that "more is better" for biodiversity purposes-then the DUS
requirements may be accomplishing something, but only at substantial administrative cost. The copy-
ight registration scheme, by contrast, expends almost nothing up front on close questions of originality.
Those questions arise later in litigation, either over originality itself or over questions like scope of
fights.
155. An expenditure which may increase with the availability of molecular marker data, given the
complexities in incorporating that data into the DUS criteria, as we have discussed.
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usefulness. 156 The paradigm of genotype calls for a different set of rules for
obtaining PVP rights.
III. OBSOLESCENCE 1N RULES OF SCOPE
Like the rules of PVP protection, the rules of PVP scope in first gen-
eration systems were designed around the concept of plant varieties, and
thus were driven by assumptions about phenotype. 157 At the time, the con-
cept of ownership of a variety (as opposed to ownership of an individual
plant or seeds) was still new, 158 and the technical understanding required to
control the genetics of a variety-by genetic recombination through basic
breeding techniques-was still evolving. 159 Against this uncertain back-
drop, first-generation PVP systems relied on a distinction between pro-
tected varieties and "other" varieties in order to establish PVP scope.
Breeders could not reproduce the protected variety unless the PVP owner
consented, 160 but breeders could use the protected variety for the purpose
of creating "other" new varieties. 161
156. Interestingly, PVP authorities have already edged away from the uniformity requirement,
deeming it less important than distinctness. UPOV C/34/10, supra note 137, T 21-22.
157. Plant breeders knew-at least since the rediscovery of Mendel's laws (in 1900)--that their
goal was to develop improved genotypes. However, selection for yield and other criteria such as pest or
stress resistance long remained dependent upon viewing or measuring morphological attributes of
plants that are grown in the field or glasshouse. In the era dominated by phenotype, genotypic selection
was indirect, practiced via the plant's physical appearance or performance in the field. -
158. As Cary Fowler puts it, only a few years earlier, it was considered that "[s]eed could be
owned, of course, but there was no way to own or control it as breeding material." FOWLER (1994),
supra note 10, at 58.
159. Only a few years previously, fundamental breeding techniques like developing inbred lines
were still considered experimental, and plant breeders had their hands full simply attempting to main-
tain the uniformity of desirable varieties. Id. at 49 (observing that even after the dawn of scientific plant
breeding, a number of breeders still considered "varieties" to be mysterious and changeable). Through
the mid-twentieth century, when first-generation PVP scope rules were being drafted, plant breeders
had very little knowledge about the genotypic basis for phenotypic traits. For example, a 1960s plant
breeding text stated, with an air of resignation, that "[qjuantitative genetic effects cannot generally be
ascribed with certainty to particular loci and the number of loci controlling quantitative characters
cannot be determined with any degree of precision." WATKIN WILLIAMS, GENETICAL PRINCIPLES AND
PLANT BREEDING 35 (1964).
Today, plant breeders are beginning to understand that productivity gains in major crops result
from a complex combination of effects, from improved husbandry (adequate soil fertility, weed control,
and chemical control of pests and diseases) to changes in the genetic make-up of varieties. See Donald
N. Duvick et al., Changes in Performance, Parentage, and Genetic Diversity of Successful Corn Hy-
brids, 1930-2000, in CORN: ORIGIN, HISTORY, TECHNOLOGY, AND PRODUCTION 65 (C. Wayne Smith,
Javier Betrin & E.C.A. Runge eds., 2004); Donald Duvick et al., Long-term Selection in a Commercial
Hybrid Maize Breeding Program, 24 PLANT BREEDING REVIEWS 109 (2004).
160. UPOV (1961), supra note 4, art. 5(l) (imposing liability for the unauthorized "production, for
purposes of commercial marketing, of the reproductive or vegetative propagating material, as such, of
the new variety, and for the offering for sale or marketing of such material.").
161. Specifically, competitors could use the protected variety without authorization "as an initial
source of variation for the purpose of creating other new varieties or for the marketing of such varieties"
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Unfortunately, these rules relied upon morphological indicia for de-
termining what made a competitor's variety something "other" than the
protected variety. Some breeders who sought to compete with PVP owners
used "cosmetic" breeding practices to manipulate trivial phenotypic charac-
teristics of the PVP-protected variety, creating a competing product while
still evading the scope of PVP rights. 162 Alternatively, the downstream
breeder might subject a PVP-protected variety to a conventional (non-
biotechnology) breeding technique such as repeated backcrossing 163 to
achieve a targeted gene insertion, again creating a competing but non-
infringing product. 164
It would have been plausible to respond to these cases by liberalizing
the notion of the variety as it appeared in first-generation PVP infringement
provisions. For example, a court faced with a PVP dispute could have ruled
as a matter of statutory construction that plants that were only trivially dif-
ferent from the protected variety remained the variety-that is, did not
qualify as some "other" variety. But this approach would have been in ten-
sion with the rules for granting PVP protection. 165 Under those rules, a
variety could be distinct from preexisting varieties for purposes of obtain-
ing protection based on differences in commercially trivial phenotypic
characteristics. 166
except "when the repeated use of the new variety is necessary for the commercial production of another
variety." Id. art. 5(3).
162. Barry Greengrass supplies an example: a competitor might evade PVP rights in a red-flowered
ornamental by inducing the protected plant to produce a slightly less-red mutant of the protected orna-
mental, then propagating the mutant without authorization. E.g., Greengrass (1991), supra note 64, at
470.
163. Backcrossing refers to breeding progeny back to one of its parents. When carried out succes-
sively, it can be effective to add a gene of interest from the progeny to the parent. POEHLMAN &
SLEPER, supra note 48, at 47, 172-75 (explaining the technique and illustrating its use).
164. For example, to evade PVP rights in a corn inbred, a competing breeder might first identify an
unprotected variety having an unimportant trait (say, silk length) that differed from the protected inbred,
then use repeated backcrossing to develop a variety having the silk length of the unprotected variety but
all other characteristics of the protected inbred. See UPOV The Concept of Essentially Derived Varie-
ties, Annex to Model Law on the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 146-47, UPOV Doc. No. 842(E)
(1996) (identifying this example as a "plagiaristic" breeding practice) [hereinafter UPOV, Model Law];
ASSINSEL, Position Paper on Essential Derivation and Dependence: Practical Information 1 (1999)
[hereinafter ASSINSEL, Practical Information], available at http://www.worldseed.org/Positionpapers/
derive.htm (referring to the problems of "cosmetic" modifications to fruit and ornamental trees through
mutations, and "'conversion' by repeated backcrossing of parental lines of hybrid varieties").
165. In principle, it is not problematic to create a set of intellectual property rules under which
technology may be the subject of one party's valid intellectual property protection yet infringe another
party's intellectual property rights. This happens frequently in patent law, where a pioneer may own
patent rights and an improver may own separate patent rights. Nonetheless, this scenario seems to have
been perceived as problematic in UPOV circles at the time.
166. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
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Plant genetic engineering-even in its early stages-manifestly en-
hanced the efficiency of cosmetic breeding to avoid PVP rights. Rather
than relying solely on conventional techniques like backcrossing, a breeder
could use plant transformation techniques to insert a gene sequence into a
PVP-protected variety, effectuating a cosmetic phenotypic variation more
quickly and efficiently than previous techniques allowed. As the science of
plant breeding continues to progress, largely though the development of
methods of experimental design, the generation and use of marker-trait
association data, the reduction of time to cycle from parents to progeny,
and data analysis which provides an improved ability to select more effec-
tively upon genotype, the potential for using molecular information to
avoid PVP infringement increases.
Second-generation PVP schemes have attempted to respond by liber-
alizing the notion of variety legislatively, through recognition of essentially
derived varieties ("EDVs"). Second-generation PVP schemes prohibit the
copying of protected varieties, restrict the copying of varieties that are es-
sentially derived from protected varieties, but otherwise allow competitors
to use the protected variety to create competing varieties by invoking the
breeder's exemption. 167 In this Part, we analyze the adequacy of the EDV
provisions as a response to obsolescence, and we consider the effect of the
continued maintenance of the breeder's exemption on PVP scope in light of
advancing technology.
A. Non-Literal Copying: The Problem of Essential Derivation
The UPOV system's most salient response to technological obsoles-
cence was to expand the scope of PVP rights through the concept of essen-
tially derived varieties. Though hailed as a "striking innovation"' 168 that
was "unique to plant breeding,"' 169 the EDV provisions and the debate sur-
rounding them bear the familiar imprint of intransigent debates in patent
law over non-literal infringement 70 and in copyright law over the distinc-
tion between unauthorized derivative works and transformative fair uses. 17 1
167. See infra Part II.B..
168. Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1993: Hearing on S. 1406 Before the Senate
Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 103d Cong. 6 (1993) [hereinafter S. 1406 Hearing] (state-
ment of Kenneth C. Clayton, U.S.D.A.) (asserting that the creation of the EDV concept "is the most
striking innovation in the 1991 revision of the UPOV convention").
169. Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1993: Hearings on H.R. 2927 Before the House
Comm. on Agriculture, 103d Cong. 72 (1994) (statement of Dietrich Schmidt, President, American
Seed Trade Association).
170. For a sampling of current views from patent law scholars on infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents, see, for example, Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and
Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947 (2005);
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The EDV provisions, first appearing in the 1991 UPOV,172 seem to
concede the inadequacy of phenotypic characteristics for establishing the
scope of PVP rights, 173 and purport to interject genotype concepts into the
phenotype-based rule set. 174 The concept of variety remained intact, 175 and
the breeder's exemption was retained, but the provisions changed the rela-
tionship between breeders of protected initial varieties and downstream
breeders of varieties derived from those initial varieties. 176 The provisions
established three conditions for determining whether a downstream variety
constituted an EDV of an initial variety: the alleged EDV must be (1) pre-
dominantly derived from the initial variety, (2) distinguishable from the
initial variety, 177 and (3) in conformity with the initial variety in "the ex-
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004); John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equiva-
lents in the Post-Markman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153 (2005).
171. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990);
Mitch Tuchman, Judge Leval's Transformation Standard: Can It Really Distinguish Foul from Fair?,
51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 101 (2003).
172. The United States followed suit in 1994, amending the PVPA to recognize the EDV concept.
173. Cooke & Reeves, supra note 107, at 84-85 (noting that the introduction of EDVs was an
acknowledgment that morphological characteristics alone cannot adequately provide a zone of protec-
tion under the PVP scheme).
174. E.g., ASSINSEL, Statement Regarding The Implementation of the New Principle of Essen-
tially Derived Varieties in the UPOV Convention (June 5, 1992), reprinted in S. 1406 Hearing, supra
note 168, at 18, 19.
In its principle, the concept of e.d.v. deals with the genotype rather than with the phenotype.
Contrary to the principle of "clear distinctness".., being judged on the basis of the expres-
sion of certain morphological or physiological characteristics, [the e.d.v, provision] has to do
with the question whether the essence of the genotype of the initial variety (i.v.) has been
taken over ....
175. Rossell6, supra note 65, at 59 (observing that the EDV concept broadens the scope of PVP
rights while leaving unchanged the concept of a variety).
176. EDV proponents also hoped that the provisions would facilitate mediation between the patent
and PVP regimes. For example, suppose that A owns a utility patent claiming a gene construct and B
owns PVP certificate on a variety. If B inserted A's patented gene construct into B's PVP'd variety
without a license from A, B was subject to liability for utility patent infringement. But the reverse
scenario-where A inserted A's patented gene construct into B's PVP'd variety-might not have sub-
jected A to PVP infringement liability under a first generation PVP scheme. A's variety would likely
have been deemed "another" variety, and A's activity would have been shielded under the breeder's
exemption under the UPOV (1961) provisions, even if A's variety conformed to B's PVP'd variety in its
essential characteristics. Greengrass (1991), supra note 64, at 471 (noting the concern). EDV propo-
nents speculated that in a second-generation PVP scheme that extended protection to EDVs, the pros-
pect that A's variety would be deemed an EDV of B's variety would bring A to the table to negotiate an
exchange of licenses with B. Id. We are not aware of any empirical studies seeking to assess whether
EDV provisions have, in fact, stimulated any significant patent/PVP licensing activity.
177. The existing provisions unnecessarily complicate the EDV inquiry by including distinctness as
an affirmative element of proof. Presumably this element is included only as a way of conveying that
the EDV inquiry need only be reached when the accused variety is distinct from the protected variety.
The U.S. PVPA and UPOV (1991) should be reformulated to specify that notwithstanding its distinct-
ness from the protected variety, a variety may still qualify as an EDV if the conditions of derivation and
conformity are met. Early proposals for amending the PVPA apparently would have adopted the ap-
proach that we have suggested. The American Seed Trade Association ("ASTA") had proposed lan-
guage that referred to varieties that were essentially derived from "but nonetheless clearly
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pression of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or
combination of genotypes of the initial variety." 178 The provisions then
expanded PVP rights to encompass EDVs, but with a caveat: an EDV falls
within the scope of the PVP rights of its underlying initial variety, but not
of any intervening EDVs. 179 This principle of limited dependence, in ef-
fect, imposes a fourth condition:180 the PVP-protected variety at issue must
be an initial variety-that is, it must not itself be an EDV of some preexist-
ing variety. 181 In sum, the EDV provisions create two levels of protection.
distinguishable from" existing protected varieties. S. 1406 Hearing, supra note 168, at 14 (statement of
Dietrich Schmidt, President, American Seed Trade Association).
178. UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 14(5)(b); accord 7 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(3) (2000). The relevant
language, as it appears in the U.S. PVPA, defines an EDV as a variety that
(i) is predominantly derived from another variety (referred to in this paragraph as the "initial
variety") or from a variety that is predominantly derived from the initial variety, while retain-
ing the expression of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or combination
of genotypes of the initial variety;
(ii) is clearly distinguishable from the initial variety; and
(iii) except for differences that result from the act of derivation, conforms to the initial variety
in the expression of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or combination
of genotypes of the initial variety.
Id. § 2401(a)(3)(A). In addition to these express references to characteristics resulting from the geno-
type, the definition proceeds to provide an open-ended list of breeding methodologies that might result
in the creation of an EDV:
An essentially derived variety may be obtained by the selection of a natural or induced mutant
or of a somaclonal variant, the selection of a variant individual from plants of the initial vari-
ety, backcrossing, transformation by genetic engineering, or other method.
Id. § 240 1(a)(3)(B); see also UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 14(5)(c).
179. UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 14(5)(a)(i); accord 7 U.S.C. § 2541(c)(1) (infringement
liability shall extend not only to proscribed acts undertaken with protected varieties, but shall also apply
equally to such acts undertaken with "any variety that is essentially derived from a protected variety,
unless the protected variety is an essentially derived variety ....").
180. Some have characterized the inquiry into EDV status (involving conditions (1)-(3)) as a
"technical" question, and the inquiry into dependence (involving condition (4)) as a "juridical" ques-
tion. ASSINSEL, Practical Information, supra note 164, at 1. We doubt that the inquiries separate so
neatly in practice. The determination of EDV status involves policy judgments, see infra notes 205-09
and accompanying text, and the juridical question of dependence may require resort to technical facts if
there is a contest over whether the protected variety enjoys initial variety status.
181. See ISF View (June 2003), supra note 144, at 11. For example, consider varieties A, A*, and
A **, where A is an initial variety, A * is essentially derived from A, and A ** is essentially derived from
A *. PVP rights in variety A extend to both A * and A **, because both are EDVs of A, and A is an initial
variety. However, any PVP rights in A * would not extend to A **, because even though A ** is an EDV
of A*, A* is itself an EDV of a preexisting variety (A). See UPOV, EDV Guidelines, reprinted in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROTECTION OF PLANT MATERIALS app. 2, at 165-66 (P. Stephen
Baensiger, Roger A. Kleese & Robert F. Barnes eds., 1993) (supplying multiple examples of the appli-
cation of the dependency concept). That is, a cascade of derivation does not have the legal consequence
of creating a cascade of dependence.
For views on the operation of the EDV rules in cases where the act of derivation occurs before
the initial variety achieves PVP protection, see Int'l Seed Fed'n, Position Paper on Essential Derivation
from a Not-yet Protected Variety and Dependency (June 2005), available at http://www.worldseed.org/
Position-papers/ED&Dependency.htm (asserting that the initial variety owner should be entitled to
provisional remedies for certain acts of derivation preceding the grant of PVP rights to the initial vari-
ety).
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For a PVP-protected variety that is also an initial variety, PVP rights extend
to the protected variety and to all EDVs, whether they are the immediate
progeny of the protected variety or EDVs from subsequent generations. For
a PVP protected variety that is not an initial variety (because it is the EDV
of some preexisting variety), PVP rights extend only to the protected vari-
ety.
There are encouraging lessons to be drawn from the implementation
of the EDV concept in existing PVP systems. For example, the industry is
developing an infrastructure for alternative dispute resolution to support
EDV determinations' 82 and is articulating norms of conduct for breeding in
specific crops. 183
However, on the whole, the EDV concept as implemented so far has
proven disappointing. First, while the EDV rules provide a platform for the
use of molecular information in PVP scope determinations, that informa-
tion is employed within a formalistic legal framework that requires inquir-
ies that are so technologically complex that they present the risk of
overwhelming, or at least masking, important underlying policy judgments.
The troublesome conformity criterion illustrates this point. 184 Second, the
EDV provisions operate on a well-intentioned, but flawed premise: that
genotype concepts can be superimposed on rule structures that were de-
signed on a foundation of phenotype. Experience with EDV provisions so
far suggests that EDVs may bring about a modest inculcation of genotype
data into PVP systems, but are not likely to serve as a springboard for
reconceptualizing the overall model for PVP systems.
182. Int'l Seed Fed'n, Procedure Rules for Dispute Settlement for the Trade in Seeds for Sowing
Purposes and for the Management of Intellectual Property: Mediation, Conciliation, Arbitration (July
2006), available at http://www.worldseed.org/pdf/DisputeSettlement_2006.pdf; Int'l Seed Fed'n,
Regulation for the Arbitration of Disputes Concerning Essential Derivation (RED) (2005) [hereinafter
RED], available at www.worldseed.org/pdf/EDV%20Arbitration%20Rules.pdf; Int'l Seed Fed'n,
Explanatory Notes: Regulation for the Arbitration of Disputes Concerning Essential Derivation (RED)
(2005), available at www.worldseed.org/pdf/Explanatory%20notes%20RED.pdf (noting that the RED
and the Explanatory Notes were "drafted as a Lex specialis" of the general arbitration rules).
183. Int'l Seed Fed'n, Guidelines for the Handling of a Dispute on EDV in Lettuce (May 2002)
[hereinafter EDV Guidelines for Lettuce], available at http://www.worldseed.org/Position-papers/
guidelines%20EDV%20Lettuce.htm; Int'l Seed Fed'n, Principles of a Code of Conduct in Essentially
Derived Varieties of Perennial Ryegrass (May 2002) [hereinafter EDV Code of Conduct for Ryegrass],
available at http://www.worldseed.org/position-papers/codeeconduct.htm; see also ISF View (June
2003), supra note 144 at 12 n.5 (reporting work towards the development of consensus genetic thresh-
olds for maize, tomato, and oilseed rape).
184. See infra Part II[.A.I.
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1. Concerns About Conformity
Although the EDV provisions set out three conditions for EDV status
(derivation, distinctness, and conformity), 185 it appears that future EDV
disputes will turn primarily on the conformity condition. 86 Under the ISF's
Regulation for the Arbitration of Disputes Concerning Essential Derivation
("RED"), if a PVP owner shows that an alleged EDV exhibits conformity
with the protected variety, a prima facie case of essential derivation is es-
tablished and the burden shifts to the alleged EDV breeder to rebut, 187 typi-
cally by showing that the alleged EDV fails the "derivation" condition (i.e.,
that it was not "predominantly derived from" the protected variety), 188 or
alternatively by attacking the initial variety status of the protected vari-
ety. 189 The only reported litigation on EDVs, Astee Flowers,190 also seems
to center around a showing of conformity.191
185. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
186. This approach may help obviate concerns about defining the relationship between distinctness
and conformity. See ISF View, supra note 144, atl3-14 (expressing the concern). Distinctness is a
measure of the existence of difference, under a rule that provides that if there is a difference in even one
essential characteristic, distinctness is shown. Conformity for EDVs is a measure of the extent of simi-
larity. If a variety Y differs in one essential characteristic of ten from a variety Z but is identical in the
remaining nine, it is quite possible that variety Y is distinct from variety Z but is still in conformity with
variety Z. In practice, the relationship is likely to be even more complicated, because the characteristics
used for determining distinctness need not be the same characteristics used for determining conformity.
See UPOV C/34/10, supra note 137, 29 ("reconfirm[ing]" that the assessment of EDVs-which
effectively means the assessment of conformity-would not be restricted to the characteristics used for
distinctness).
187. RED, supra note 182, art. 6.1; see also EDV Code of Conduct for Ryegrass, supra note 183,
4; EDV Guidelines for Lettuce, supra note 183, 5.
188. According to the ISF, the downstream breeder is in the best position to access its own breed-
ing books or other evidence refuting predominant derivation, justifying the burden shift. Explanatory
Notes, supra note 182, at I (asserting that predominant derivation is "difficult or impossible" for the
PVP owner to prove); UPOV, EDV Guidelines, supra note 181, at 163-64 (downstream breeder in a
"uniquely strong position to provide evidence" on derivation); see also M. Heckenberger, M. Bohn &
A.E. Melchinger, Identification of Essentially Derived Varieties Obtained from Biparental Crosses of
Homozygous Lines: L Simple Sequence Repeat Data from Maize Inbreds, 45 CROP. Sci. 1120, 1120
(2005) [hereinafter Heckenberger 1 (2005)] (pedigree data will usually not be available to the PVP
holder who wants to evaluate a suspected EDV).
189. That is, by arguing that the protected variety is itself an EDV of some prior variety.
190. Astee Flowers B.V./Danziger Flower Farm, KG 02/1014, 18 Oct. 2002 (Neth.) (provisional
judgment), abstracted in PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION (UPOV, Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 2002, at 7.
191. Id. Notably, neither the RED nor the Astee Flowers decision places any significance in the
distinctness criterion. In practice, the conformity requirement may well overlap with the derivation
requirement. Direct evidence of derivation in intellectual property disputes is notoriously difficult to
obtain. Plant breeding records for the accused variety might supply direct evidence that the protected
variety was in the accused variety's lineage, but if the records are unreliable or nonexistent, courts may
need to decide whether circumstantial evidence of derivation suffices. In copyright law, evidence
creating an inference of the defendant's probable access to the protected material, plus substantial
similarity between the accused and protected material, suffices for a circumstantial showing of copying.
See supra note 23 (discussing copyright principles). In the EDV provisions, the existing requirement for
conformity would seem to duplicate any substantial similarity requirement. A court might reasonably
conclude from this that the derivation requirement in the EDV provision is satisfied merely by a show-
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Most observers expect that the conformity assessment will rest on a
quantitative inquiry. Under this approach, reflected in the RED192 and other
documents, the PVP owner is expected to provide conformity data demon-
strating that the alleged EDV exceeds a predetermined, crop-specific
threshold that reflects the initial variety's contribution to the alleged EDVs
genome. 193 The threshold may be a single value--demarcating a fixed
boundary between a "red" zone of presumptive EDV status and a "green"
zone 194-or it may be a range of values, defining a red zone above the up-
per end of the range, a green zone below the lower end, and an "orange"
zone within the range where conformity is a matter of reasonable debate
and must be resolved by further investigation. 195
While the focus on a quantitative basis for assessing conformity might
provide a natural entry point for molecular marker data 96 and may even
provide a short-term solution to obsolescence problems, we have serious
reservations about whether the EDV framework (and conformity in particu-
lar) provides a viable long-term solution for adapting PVP protection to the
realities of the era of genotype. We base this assessment on a number of
considerations. First, the technical literature reveals not only the lack of
consensus in establishing threshold values for specified crops, 197 but also
ing that the propagating material of the protected variety was distributed widely enough to make it
probable that the defendant had access to it. We suspect that this showing would be straightforward in
many cases. The EDV provisions should be amended to clarify that circumstantial evidence of access
suffices to show derivation.
192. RED, supra note 182, art. 2(e) (defining "EDV Threshold").
193. Id. art. 3. Where no predetermined threshold exists and the parties have not agreed to a thresh-
old, the arbitral panel has discretion to decide what showing, if any, suffices to shift the burden to the
downstream breeder. Id. art. 6.2.
194. See, e.g., EDV Code of Conduct for Ryegrass, supra note 183, 3 (establishing a single
threshold); EDV Guidelines for Lettuce, supra note 183, 4 (same).
195. ASSINSEL, Practical Information, supra note 164, at 3-4 (proposing a three-zone hierarchy);
see also Explanatory Notes, supra note 182, at 2 n.1 (reporting that maize growers have agreed to
accept a three-zone hierarchy).
196. For a representative expression of enthusiasm, see, for example, R. Bemardo & A.L. Kahler,
North American Study on Essential Derivation in Maize: Inbreds Developed Without and with Selection
from F2 Populations, 102 THEORETICAL APPLIED GENETICS 986 (2001) (asserting that "[m]olecular
markers have been generally accepted as a means for determining essential derivation"); see also Cooke
& Reeves, supra note 107, at 85 (describing a prospective EU-funded data gathering project that will
attempt to generate data on genetic distances for use in clarifying the EDV concept). Some have rec-
ommended the use of marker data for assessing EDVs in vegetatively propagated crop, where genetic
profiles would be expected to have high degrees of relatedness due to the nature of asexual reproduc-
tion. See J. lbanez & F.A. van Eeuwijk, Microsatellite Profiles as a Basis for Intellectual Property
Protection in Grape, 603 ACTA HORTICULTURAE 41 (2003) (STMS markers); Ben Vosman et al., The
Establishment of "Essential Derivation" Among Rose Varieties, Using AFLP, 109 THEORETICAL
APPLIED GENETICS 1718, 1725 (2004) (recommends the use of markers for EDVs in rose mutants and
argues for a 0.95 threshold).
197. Heckenberger 1 (2005), supra note 188, at 1120 (observing that EDV provisions do not define
genetic thresholds, and that plant breeders have not developed a consensus on appropriate thresholds for
specific crops); see also M. Heckenberger et al., Identification of Essentially Derived Varieties Ob-
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questions about the normative desirability of establishing a fixed related-
ness threshold for a given crop that would apply to the breeding of all traits
into that crop, irrespective of whether those traits are single-gene discrete
traits or multi-gene, quantitatively inherited traits. 198 Even if the concept of
crop-specific threshold values were deemed acceptable, there remain the
manifest technical difficulties in establishing and implementing threshold
values, including difficulties concerning measurement standards and meth-
ods, 199 choice of technological tools and standards for using those tools,2 00
and choice of overarching methodological frameworks for employing those
measurement techniques and marker sets. 201 While it would be naive to
tained from Biparental Crosses of Homozygous Lines: II. Morphological Distances and Heterosis in
Comparison with Simple Sequence Repeat and Amplified Fragment Length Polymorphism Data in
Maize, 45 CROP. SC. 1132, 1132 (2005) (reiterating.these conclusions); ASSINSEL, Practical Informa-
tion, supra note 164, at 4 (also noting that industry standards on genetic thresholds would not bind
courts).
198. W. Lesser & M.A. Mutschler, Balancing Investment Incentives and Social Benefits when
Protecting Plant Varieties: Implementing Initial Variety Systems, 44 CROP. SC. 1113, 1117-19 (2004).
Lesser & Mutschler propose that for discrete traits, if the downstream variety contains the trait, it
should be deemed prima facie essentially derived from all ancestors containing that trait. Id. at 1119.
That is, for such traits, Lesser & Mutschler would apparently eliminate the conformity assessment and
would expand the principle of dependence beyond the initial variety to intervening varieties.
For complex traits, Lesser & Mutschler suggest using the existing EDV framework, but using
a relatively low relatedness threshold to account for the fact that "complex, multigene improvements by
definition involve more genetic differences than simple, single gene ones." Id.
The Lesser & Mutschler proposal focuses on fine tuning PVP incentives, but, like the existing
EDV scheme, it could entail complex technical judgments and substantial administrative costs. We take
Lesser & Mutschler to be arguing principally that the existing EDV scheme is unworkable, a proposi-
tion that we take seriously.
199. Int'l Seed Fed'n, Issues to be Addressed by Technical Experts to Define Molecular Marker
Sets for Establishing Thresholds for ISF EDV Arbitration (2005), available at
http://www.worldseed.org/pdf/Technical% 20rules%20EDV%20threshold.pdf (posing numerous
questions conceming choices of sampling techniques, appropriate marker systems, statistical methods
for measuring genetic distances, and other protocols). The ISF's regulation governing arbitration of
EDV disputes confusingly provides that "each molecular method" used in EDV arbitration must "con-
form" to the ISF Issues paper. RED, supra note 182, art. 3(3). Since that paper merely presents ques-
tions, "conforming" to it is rather an odd requirement.
200. E.g., Martin Heckenberger et al., Variation of DNA Fingerprints Among Accessions Within
Maize Inbred Lines and Implications for Identification of Essentially Derived Varieties: II. Genetic and
Technical Sources of Variation in AFLP Data and Comparison with SSR Data, 12 MOLECULAR
BREEDING 97, 104-05 (2003) (recommending that AFLPs and SSRs be used as complements; otherwise
breeders might "select for genetic diversity at some SSR markers to avoid an EDV, while maintaining a
high degree of relatedness in other genomie regions"); see also Lombard et al., supra note 138, at 62
(advocating the use of markers, but only when combined with morphological data, to develop genetic
distance estimators; suggesting that this might be achieved "by searching for molecular markers linked
to the variation of morphological traits (QTL) or involved in the expression of these characters (EST)");
Ibanez & van Eeuwijk, supra note 196 (assessing the use of STMSs for grape characterization, with the
objective of using such protocols to show infringement or EDVs).
201. For example, Heckenberger et al. advocate the use of SSR markers to set genetic thresholds
for assessing EDVs by revealing pedigree relationships, in contrast with the methodology employed in
the EDV Code of Conduct for Ryegrass, where EDV thresholds would be based on percentiles of the
distribution of genetic distance values in a reference set of germplasm. Heckenberger 1 (2005), supra
note 188, at 1130 (asserting that the choice of elite varieties for a reference set may involve too much
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suggest that these problems could be avoided altogether in a newly de-
signed genotype-centered intellectual property regime, they are critical in a
regime like PVP, which requires the elucidation of precise boundary lines
to define the scope of the protected subject matter.202 There is some evi-
dence that the scale and complexity of the project to use EDVs to delineate
PVP scope is becoming apparent in the plant breeding community as initial
enthusiasm about EDV provisions is giving way to more sober reflection
about the costs and challenges that EDVs entail203 and to more searching
questions about the incentive effects of EDVs. 204
The technical complexity of the conformity inquiry, and the intransi-
gence of the technical issues bound up in implementing that inquiry, sug-
gest that EDVs will be costly to administer. But these factors also present a
second, more subtle problem: the enterprise of wading through the techni-
calities of conformity may become an end in itself, lending false objectivity
to what is actually a subjective value judgment 205-a "'gentleman['s]
agreement' between breeders and [government] authorities" rather than a
"statistical question[]. '' 206
The debate over EDVs for maize illustrates the subjectivity concern.
One pertinent article advances arguments for minimum threshold values of
90%, reasoning that major corn breeding firms all started with materials
from the same public breeding programs, so that there is already a high
subjective judgment). Hybrid crops pose additional challenges. See Explanatory Notes, supra note 182,
at 3 (pointing out that derivation is not practiced directly from a hybrid, but rather from the hybrid's
parents, and suggesting that the EDV assessment must be adjusted accordingly to focus on derivation
from the hybrid's parents).
202. By contrast, as we suggest infra Part IV, in a regime that focuses on acts of misappropriation,
a complex inquiry like conformity would be less important.
203. van Eeuwijk & Baril, supra note 110, at 51 (arguing that "[i]n the early days of the essential
derivation concept it was believed that genetic similarities as calculated from marker information could
straightforwardly be interpreted as estimators of pedigree relations," but suggesting that this initial
enthusiasm was unfounded despite the emergence of various proposed genetic distance methodologies,
and concluding that "it still seems that approaching essential derivation via genetic relatedness creates
prohibitive complications").
204. For example, Lesser & Mutschler point out that because the EDV rules provide only for
limited dependence-that is, no cascading of dependence, such that any given variety is only deemed
dependent on an initial variety, not any intervening varieties-EDV rules might not provide satisfactory
incentives where the breeding enterprise involves "pyramiding"-breeding new varieties that add traits
to the initial variety. Lesser & Mutschler, supra note 198, at 1117. Applied to this scenario, EDV rules
might overcompensate initial variety developers while undercompensating breeders of intervening
varieties. Lesser & Mutschler also express concerns that EDV rules might systematically undercompen-
sate breeders who are enhancing germplasm (i.e., moving a discrete trait from a wild variety to a fin-
ished variety). Id.
205. UPOV, EDV Guidelines, supra note 181, at 161 (the conformity condition of the EDV analy-
sis "primarily calls for a value judgment").
206. Lombard et al., supra note 138, at 61.
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level of background relatedness. 207 Regardless of the weight to be attrib-
uted to this argument, the choice of 90% as the precise quantitative stan-
dard was not apparently based on any quantitative calculations, but instead
on a value judgment: the paper simply concluded that 90% "seems appro-
priate. '20 8 Others have called for 70-80% relatedness thresholds. 209
If, as we suggest is the case, EDV determinations are ultimately driven
by subjective judgments, we question the wisdom of a system that requires
those judgments to be buried beneath a blizzard of intricate quantitative
assessments that can only be undertaken at considerable cost. In our view,
this approach has it backwards; a better model would make explicit the
governing subjective factors, and would allow parties to resort to quantita-
tive evidence as one type of evidence that assists in establishing the exis-
tence or non-existence of those subjective factors.
2. Continued Predominance of Phenotype
Although the EDV rules appear on the surface to provide a mechanism
for adapting phenotype-bound scope rules to the genotyping era, the Astee
Flowers decision suggests that phenotypic characteristics will continue to
drive the scope analysis. Danziger owned Community plant variety rights
in a variety called "Million Stars, '210 and its competitor Astee introduced a
variety called "Blancanieves," which Danziger alleged was an EDV of
Million Stars. 211 In litigation, both parties offered molecular marker evi-
dence. Danziger's tests showed a difference in markers of 5 out of 214, or
2.3%; Astee's tests showed a difference of 12 out of 133, or 9%. Astee had
also procured expert statements detailing phenotypic differences between
the disputed varieties and questioning the methodology used in Danziger's
marker tests.
In summary proceedings, the court ruled that Danziger had failed to
make a plausible case for the existence of an EDV.212 The court found it
significant that both parties' genetic tests showed that "the genotype of
207. A. Forrest Troyer & Torbert R. Rocheford, Germplasm Ownership: Related Corn Inbreds, 42
CROP Sa. 3, 9 (2002) (also arguing that royalties payable for EDVs should extend only for five years).
208. Id.
209. Bernardo & Kahler, supra note 196, at 988 (calling for a 70-80% relatedness threshold for
maize).
210. A Gypsophila, known commonly as "baby's breath."
211. Danziger distributed letters to the trade alleging that Blancanieves was a mutant of Million
Stars. In response, Astee initiated summary proceedings in the Netherlands, seeking various orders in
connection with the letters, and Danziger counterclaimed for infringement, thus placing the merits of
the EDV allegation in issue. Astee Flowers B.V./Danziger Flower Farm, KG 02/1014, 1-2, 18 Oct.
2002 (Neth.).
212. Id. T 4.12.
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Blancanieves differs from that of Million Stars," 213 but the court did not
elaborate on the point. That is, the court did not accept any particular quan-
titative threshold value as defining a forbidden "red zone," a judgment that
might have taken the court into the intricacies of the genotyping evidence.
Instead of the anticipated quantitative assessment focusing on confor-
mity, the court's impressions of the phenotypic evidence seemed to drive
the conclusion. 214 The court accepted that "the phenotype of Blancanieves
differs from that of Million Stars regarding a number of points including
plant height, branching, length of the flower stem and diameter of the
flower" and considered it relevant that "Blancanieves was found to have no
stamens while Million Stars did have stamens. '215 Provisionally, the court
ruled that the identified phenotypic characteristics were "essential charac-
teristics, resulting from the hereditary material of Blancanieves and which
are not present in Million Stars. '216 Thus, where phenotypic characteristics
are used to establish conformity and thus to trigger a presumption of EDV
status, 217 genotype evidence may well be relegated to a role (if any) as a
potential source of rebuttal evidence on derivation.218 The EDV exercise
may collapse back to predominantly phenotypic comparisons.
We think that the effort to continue to work out guidelines for employ-
ing or accounting for molecular techniques in EDV adjudication is a hard
path. We applaud these efforts as a short-term fix, but we think that ulti-
mately it will be determined that a genotype-centered EDV concept, even if
it could be designed, would still be incompatible with the regime of pheno-
type-centered rules.
B. The Breeder's Exemption and the Erosion of Natural Lead Time
The consequence of extending PVP protection in second-generation
PVP systems to EDVs was necessarily to narrow the range of downstream
breeding activities allowed under the breeder's exemption. 219 But the pol-
icy commitment to the breeder's exemption remained, and the 1991 UPOV
213. Id. 4.11.
214. Danziger had argued, apparently as a matter of law, that phenotypic differences were irrele-
vant to the EDV determination. Id. T 4.10. This position would be difficult to square with the language
of the EDV provisions, supra note 178, which calls for conformity "in the expression of the essential
characteristics that result from the genotype .... " (emphasis supplied).
215. Astee Flowers, KG 02/1014, 4.11.
216. Id.
217. ISF View (June 2003), supra note 144, at 12 (assessment of the conformity requirement
"could be based on reliable phenotypic characteristics").
218. Id.
219. E.g., HELFER, supra note 3, at 16 (asserting that the implementation of EDVs has had the
effect of narrowing the breeder's exemption and expanding the rights of first-generation breeders).
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language amplified the importance of the exemption by housing it in an
article separate from the infringement provisions. 220 The 1991 UPOV Dip-
lomatic Conference "strongly reaffirmed" the breeder's exemption 221 and
insisted that the incorporation of EDVs did not undermine the exemp-
tion. 222 As recently as 1999, the leading industry group remained officially
of the view that the breeder's exemption is "essential for continued pro-
gress from plant breeding. '223
Implicitly, at least, the breeder's exemption in both first and second
generation PVP systems has always attempted to accommodate twin com-
peting aspirations. First, reflecting the inherently cumulative nature of plant
breeding, the breeder's exemption signifies a desire to provide downstream
breeders with access to existing PVP-protected germplasm in order to
breed new varieties. According to UPOV, the existence of the breeder's
exemption "optimizes variety improvement by ensuring that germplasm
sources remain accessible to all the community of breeders" while it also
"helps to ensure that the genetic basis for plant improvement is broadened
and is actively conserved, thereby ensuring an overall approach to plant
breeding which is sustainable and productive in the long term. '224
Second, the breeder's exemption, taken in concert with the infringe-
ment provisions and the provisions establishing the term of PVP protection,
aspires to provide innovation incentives to breeders by offering the promise
of a commercially meaningful scope and period of exclusivity. In theory,
these provisions would incorporate a set of expectations about the commer-
cial realities of plant breeding, including considerations of the de facto
220. UPOV (1991), supra note 6, art. 15(1)(iii).
221. Greengrass (1991), supra note 64, at 471.
222. E.g., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON
AGRICULTURE: A RESOURCE MANUAL § 5.2.4 (2000), available at http://www.fao.org/documents/
show-cdr.asp?url file=/docrep/003/x7355e/x7355e05.htm (observing that the breeder's exemption
under UPOV 1991 does not apply to the breeding of essentially derived varieties, but noting that "the
free availability under the 1978 Convention of the underlying genetic resource embodied in a protected
plant variety for the purpose of breeding is reaffirmed in the 1991 Convention").
223. ASSINSEL, Practical Information, supra note 164, at 1.
224. UPOV, The UPOV System of Plant Variety Protection, http://www.upov.int/en/about/
upov-system.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2007) (discussing Article 15 of the 1991 UPOV); see also
UPOV, Statement on the Breeder's Exemption (Dec. 6, 2004), http://www.upov.int/en/about
/pdf/breeders exemption.pdf (official explanation dated December 6, 2004, concerning the breeder's
exemption, the explanation being "intended to clarify that the authorization of the breeder for the use of
protected varieties for breeding purposes is required neither under the 1978 Act nor under the 1991
Act"); ISF View (June 2003), supra note 144, at 8-9 ("The objective of the breeder's exception is to
give access to PVPed genetic resources that are commercially available allowing their use for further
breeding.').
Perhaps the continued veneration of the breeder's exemption should not come as a surprise.
Jim Chen has pointed out that the breeder's exemption seems to have grown from "a romantic vision of
innovation" in which individual plant breeders freely exchanged germplasm with the objective of
developing improved varieties "for the good of agriculture." Chen, supra note 3, at 138.
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commercial lifetime of protected variety, 225 which in turn includes consid-
erations of natural lead time-the time it takes for downstream breeders to
use the protected variety to develop competing varieties-enjoyed by a
PVP owner.226
Despite the longstanding expressions of faith in the breeder's exemp-
tion, it has never been clear that the coupling of a robust immunity for
competing breeders with PVP-style infringement provisions is effective to
achieve either the access or incentive aspirations. Moreover, the techno-
logical shift from phenotype-driven to genotype-driven breeding practices,
along with other legal changes, presents a risk of compromising the effec-
tiveness of PVP systems, particularly as applied to the cereal crops.
As to the access aspiration, the breeder's exemption has always been
premised on the assumption that downstream breeders would have access
to PVP-protected seed, but nothing in the PVP rules guarantees that access.
There is no requirement that a PVP owner deposit seed in an accessible
depository, nor is there any rule analogous to utility patent law's "enable-
ment" requirement. 227 It has simply been assumed that a PVP owner would
commercialize the PVP-protected variety, and downstream breeders could
access the variety through usual commercial channels.
Whether that assumption is warranted depends upon the individual
proclivities of PVP owners. The assumption has become especially ques-
tionable, however, in second-generation PVP systems extending PVP pro-
tection to hybrids. Because the PVP owner is not obliged to provide an
"enabling" teaching of the hybrid, the owner need not release the parental
lines of the hybrid. Even if the PVP'd hybrid is commercially released,
such that a competing breeder may access it and attempt to breed a distinct
225. As Koo et al. point out, relevant considerations include the size of the seed market for a par-
ticular crop, the commercial success of the particular variety, and varietal obsolescence (biological or
planned). Koo et al., supra note 13, at 4-6. Regulatory delays experienced by both the original and
downstream breeders also are relevant. On the outcomes of such calculations for particular crops, see,
for example, Proposed Amendments to the Plant Variety Protection Act: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Agric., 101st Cong. 9 (1990) (statement of Owen J. Newlin, Senior Vice-President, Pioneer
Hi-Bred lnt'l, Inc.) ("A new variety has a useful life of about 6 years."); RICHARD J. PATTERSON, NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
CONTRACTOR DOCUMENTS, PART 3, at 27-28 (1988) (asserting that in the late 1980s, the commercial
life of a typical corn hybrid variety was 6-8 years, with exceptional varieties remaining commercially
viable for 10-20 years, and some inbred lines having a much longer commercial life); id. at 36 (assert-
ing that expected cultivar lifespans for wheat grown during the mid- to late-twentieth century were
about 5-9 years).
226. Cf Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experi-
mental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (outlining the key elements of a policy analysis of the
experimental use exception in utility patent law).
227. See Janis & Kesan (2002), supra note 3, at 747-48; see also Chen, supra note 3, at 139-54
(analyzing the access question in detail).
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hybrid variety from it, this is likely to be less efficient than accessing the
parent line and breeding a distinct parent line from it.228 Recognition of this
problem has prompted some calls for reform. 229
In our view, however, the greater threat-perhaps the most serious
threat to PVP systems in the area of grain crops-is the threat that new
genomics technologies will allow downstream breeders, operating under
the breeder's exemption, to so erode the defacto lead time provided by the
PVP system that any PVP incentives will be seriously diminished. When
first-generation PVP systems were created, notwithstanding the breeder's
exemption, PVP owners enjoyed a de facto exclusivity period because it
took downstream breeders time-perhaps ten years-to breed a finished
variety out of the protected variety. 230 That is, the breeder's exemption,
understood in its contemporary technical context, amounted to a judgment
about the appropriate amount of inherent lead time that PVP owners would
enjoy against others who would undertake breeding activities with the pro-
tected variety under the exemption.
Second-generation PVP systems have retained the breeder's exemp-
tion, but the co-deployment of genomics techniques with breeding tech-
niques such as doubled haploids (a practice which reduces recombination
and dramatically increases the speed with which new inbred lines or varie-
ties can be created) and more widespread use of off-season nurseries (al-
lowing multiple generations of plants per year) significantly alters the
balance between PVP owners and downstream breeders. Genomics tech-
niques and new breeding strategies will facilitate access to germplasm that
was previously protected by the biology of hybrids, and also will reduce
significantly the time it takes to breed new varieties, thus substantially re-
ducing the defacto lead time that the PVP owner would have enjoyed in a
pre-genomics age. 23 1 For example, by employing a marker-assisted selec-
228. ISF View (June 2003), supra note 144, at 8-9.
229. Richard L. McConnell, Developing Genetic Resources for the Future: The Long Look, 7 BIO-
SCIENCE L. REv. 57, 59 (2004) (suggesting that UPOV be amended to provide "assured access to seed
deposits for all varieties").
230. It was understood that "[t]he breeder may often spend years creating a breeding program to
develop a new variety." Proposed Amendments to the Plant Variety Protection Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Dept. Operations, Research, and Foreign Agric. of the House Comm. on Agric., 101st
Cong. 30 (1990) (statement of Jerome J. Peterson, President, American Seed Trade Association); H.R.
REP. No. 96-1115, at 4 (1980); see also BUTLER & MARION, supra note 39, at 5 (estimating that "[n]ew
varieties can take 10-12 years, and sometimes as long as 20 years, to develop").
231. Heckenberger 1 (2005), supra note 188, at 1120 ("The advent of new methods such as genetic
engineering and marker-assisted backcrossing, however, has provided the basis to undermine the
breeder's exemption in its original intention."); William Kingston, Repairing Incentives to Invest in
Plant Breeding (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (same); see also Reichman, supra note 1,
at 2452 (noting the problem in general that "today's innovators often lack the natural lead time that
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tion technique that uses "a large number of molecular markers that cover
the plant's entire genome," a downstream breeder can identify which indi-
vidual PVP-protected plants "contain the largest contribution of genetic
material from the recurrent recipient line," allowing the breeder to intro-
duce a new desired allele in fewer generations of breeding.232 Also emerg-
ing are new "reverse breeding" techniques in which the downstream
breeder employs molecular marker and transgenic technologies (and other
techniques) to recreate the performance of existing varieties using less re-
combination and segregation than conventional techniques use, but still
enough recombination of parental lines to provide an argument against
EDV status. 233
Recognizing these concerns, some in the plant breeding industry now
advocate the development of phased-in, crop-specific breeder's exemp-
tions. 234 For example, Rick McConnell has recommended a phased-in
breeder's exemption for maize that would (1) establish a first phase of ten
years from the PVP application filing date during which no breeder's ex-
emption would apply, and (2) establish a second phase, from the end of the
first phase through PVP expiration, in which breeders could operate under
the exemption if they complied with recording requirements. 235
enabled innovators in the past to secure a place in the market and to recoup their costs of research and
development").
232. CULLIS, supra note 95, at 163; see also Smith, supra note 56, at 13-14. Developments in the
study of complex (quantitatively inherited) traits, particularly the mapping of quantitative trait loci
("QTLs") have greatly enhanced the breeding process. Tanksley & McCouch, supra note 44, at 1065
("Often a substantial portion of the genetic variation of a population can be explained by a few QTLs of
moderately large effects."). QTLs can be identified and marker-assisted selection can be used to remove
undesirable alleles that are in the vicinity of the QTL. Smith, supra note 56, at 13. For a literature
review, see Trudy F.C. Mackay, The Genetic Architecture of Quantitative Traits, 35 ANN. REV.
GENETICS 303 (2001); see also CULLIS, supra note 95, at 152-60 (detailed technical discussion and
example).
The view that molecular-enhanced breeding techniques will offer more rapid progress than
conventional breeding is widely held, but does have its detractors. See, e.g., Major M. Goodman, Plant
Breeding Requirements for Applied Molecular Biology, 44 CROP. SCI. 1913 (2004) (asserting that
"[pllant breeding is unlikely to be radically altered by genetic engineering despite progress in genom-
ics" because it will still take over a decade on average to incorporate a new gene into a commercially
successful cultivar).
233. Smith, supra note 56, at 16. Generally, as plant genetic sequences become better characterized
through the use of genomics techniques, researchers are using those sequences (or induced mutations to
them) to predict phenotypic characteristics-an exercise in "reverse" genetics. For a relevant review,
see Steven Henikoff & Luca Comai, Single-Nucleotide Mutations for Plant Functional Genomics, 54
ANN. REV. PLANT BIOLOGY 375 (2003).
234. McConnell, supra note 229, at 59-60 (describing the second phase as allowing "organised and
recorded access for breeding"); News Release, Am. Seed Trade Ass'n, Position Statement on Intellec-
tual Property Rights for the Seed Industry T 10(d)(iii) (July 15, 2004), available at
http://www.amseed.com/ newsDetail.asp?id=97 (advocating revisions to the breeder's exemption to
include a predetermined period, varying by crop, during which the exemption would be unavailable).
235. McConnell, supra note 229, at 60; see also Michael A. Kock, Susann Porzig & Eva Willneg-
ger, The Legal Protection of Plant-Biotechnological Inventions and Plant Varieties in Light of the EC
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Proposals of this sort have the merit of addressing directly the diminu-
tion of lead time by conferring an absolute exclusivity period on PVP own-
ers. But they operate on the premise that the existing model of infringement
provisions coupled with exemptions can be refined sufficiently to achieve
the goals of the PVP system. As with EDVs, we wonder whether there is an
easier path that is not so deeply wedded to existing PVP models. We turn to
that discussion next.
IV. SYSTEMIC RESPONSES TO OBSOLESCENCE
In PVP systems, the response to dramatic technological change has
been incremental. As we have seen, PVP systems have retained their basic
orientation around the concept of variety and their preference for the DUS
criteria as rules of protection, but have attempted to adapt their rules of
scope by extending PVP scope to essentially derived varieties. The results
have been mixed.
We expect that efforts to fine tune PVP protection through refine-
ments to existing PVP concepts will continue, and we applaud those ef-
forts. But this blinkered approach to reform comes at a cost, the cost of
assuming that the existing model of PVP protection-the model we have
described as a modified copyright model with exemptions-should remain
the operative model. Reform efforts that take the existing model as a start-
ing point will prove more satisfactory as long-term responses to obsoles-
cence if they proceed with an understanding of the costs and benefits of
alternative models that do not necessarily organize themselves around con-
cepts like variety, DUS, and the breeder's exemption.
In the field of plant variety protection, a debate about fundamental
models-copyright-like property rights model vs. other models-would be
new. But it finds ample precedent in intellectual property policy more gen-
erally. A powerful debate in contemporary copyright law asks whether
collections of data are best protected through a copyright (property rights)
model, or a sui generis data protection regime that relies on unfair competi-
tion principles. 236 Similar tensions can be found in the law of trade se-
crets 237 and trademarks. 238
Biopatent Directive, 37 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 135, 145 (2006) (endorsing
McConnell's suggested reforms to the breeder's exemption and also suggesting "a limitation of the
breeders' exemption for hybrid parental lines that are coincidentally present in the seeds"). Another
commentator would apparently eliminate the breeder's exemption but impose a compulsory licensing
regime. Kingston, supra note 23 1, at 3.
236. The literature is large. Representative samples include J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A
Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellec-
[Vol 82:3
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
In this Part, we outline an unfair competition model for plant varieties
and show how it can serve as a counterpoint to the existing PVP model.
Our model is not a legislative proposal, but rather a vehicle for provoking a
discussion of the fundamental assumptions underlying existing PVP sys-
tems. We hope that such a discussion generates a more robust systemic
response to obsolescence.
A. Unfair Competition as an Alternative Model
Our model starts from the premise that plants need not be conceptual-
ized as varieties for purposes of constructing an effective intellectual prop-
erty regime, but rather can be conceptualized as datasets. 239 If plants may
be understood as datasets, then it may be illuminating to conceive of plant
dataset protection as one form of plant intellectual property that may be
viable in an era of genotyping-a form that would coexist with other im-
portant forms of protection, such as utility patents.
We conceive of plant dataset protection as a model that draws from
principles of unfair competition. There are several reasons for choosing this
orientation. First, it serves our main purpose-providing a model that pre-
sents important contrasts when juxtaposed against existing PVP models.
Second, such a model has intuitive appeal even apart from its use as a good
discussion model: it might actually work. Wendy Gordon has argued that
an unfair competition model may be attractive in cases where high devel-
opment costs and low copying costs lead to market failure, and the market
failure might be averted by providing the original innovator with legal
rights that emulate lead time.240 While it may be easy to argue that those
conditions may be found in many industries, we think they apply to plant
breeding, and we find the invocation of artificial lead time especially com-
pelling in view of the capacity for new genomics technologies to erode lead
time.2 41
tual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (2003); J.H. Reichman, Database Pro-
tection in a Global Economy, 2002 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 455.
237. Where the law oscillates between a pure property approach to trade secret, emphasizing the
delineation of exclusive rights, and a tort approach, emphasizing the nature of trade secret misappro-
priation and its harms.
238. See, e.g., David S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New Millen-
nium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659, 1687-90 (2004) (explaining shifts in Supreme Court trademark
jurisprudence between an intellectual property view and an unfair competition view of trademarks).
239. See supra Part ll.A.3 for a discussion of the point.
240. Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Prop-
erty, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 863-65 (1992); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 236, at 141.
241. See supra Part III.B (discussing the breeder's exemption).
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1. Core Unfair Competition Principles
The concept of unfair competition is well established in intellectual
property theory, 242 even though the precise contours of specific unfair
competition causes of action tend to resist careful delineation. Unfair com-
petition has long existed as part of the international landscape of intellec-
tual property law, enshrined, for example, in Paris Convention Article
1 Obis.2 43 For purposes of exploring our model, we offer four core princi-
ples that characterize unfair competition regimes:
(1) Unfair competition is relational-that is, it reflects a relationship
between contesting parties rather than directly reflecting rights against the
rest of the world.244
(2) Unfair competition regimes usually rely heavily on case-by-case
adjudication. 245 Determinations are ex post, rendered through formal adju-
dication, or, in theory, through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
or even informal codes of conduct.
(3) Unfair competition law does not divide neatly into rules of protec-
tion and rules of enforceable scope. In an unfair competition regime, eligi-
ble subject matter is typically defined loosely, and criteria of protection, if
any, are typically not elaborated in detail, in contrast to the highly-
242. E.g., ANSELM KAMPERMAN SANDERS, UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: THE PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL CREATIVITY (1997); CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, THE LAW OF PASSING-
OFF 31-40 (2d ed. 1995) (law of unfair competition in British common law); WIPO, PROTECTION
AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION (1994) (discussing, inter alia, the unfair competition action as under-
stood in civil law jurisdictions). In the U.S., much of the debate has focused on whether unfair competi-
tion principles should be given recognition through a free-standing common law misappropriation cause
of action. A sampling of important works includes Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellec-
tual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992); Dennis S. Karjala, Misappro-
priation as a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2594 (1994); Richard A.
Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUs. L. REV. 621 (2003); J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and
Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000); and
numerous other works by Professor Reichman; see also Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits:
Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449 (1992), reprinted in 34
MCGEORGE L. REV. 541 (2003); Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive
Norm ofIntellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991).
243. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10bis(l), Mar. 20, 1883, as
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, amended, Sept. 28, 1979
(binding Paris Convention countries to provide "effective protection against unfair competition"); id.
art. 10bis(2) (defining an act of unfair competition as "[a]ny act of competition contrary to honest
practices in industrial or commercial matters"). On the stature of Article l0bis in U.S. law, see, for
example, William E. Denham IV, Comment, No More than Lanham, No Less than Paris?: A Federal
Law of Unfair Competition, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 795 (2001); Patricia V. Norton, Note, The Effect of
Article lObis of the Paris Convention on American Unfair Competition Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 225
(1999).
244. SANDERS, supra note 242, at 78.
245. Id. at 82.
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elaborated, formal rules of protection that characterize property rights sys-
tems.
(4) Unfair competition law rarely employs sharply drawn infringement
provisions coupled with specific exemptions. Instead, unfair competition
rules strive to provide "guidance for determining the equity" of defendant's
behavior.246 Liability generally depends on the competitive harm to the
plaintiff that results from the defendant's acts. 247
While unfair competition principles in U.S. law are routinely dis-
cussed in connection with the free-standing, common law tort of misappro-
priation, more germane illustrations for our purposes may be found among
legislative proposals for sui generis protection of databases, described be-
low.
2. Database Protection Legislation as an Illustration
Legislative proposals for database protection show how unfair compe-
tition principles may be embodied in a statutory intellectual property
scheme. 248 The most recently debated proposal to date249 incorporates a
number of rules that might be adapted for use in a plant dataset unfair com-
petition regime. In the legislative proposal, protectable subject matter (a
"database") is defined primarily by function, rather than by formal quali-
ties.250 The proposal eschews any elaborate scheme of rules of protection,
instead simply calling for a showing that the database was "generated,
gathered, or maintained through a substantial expenditure of financial re-
246. Id. at 86; see also id. at 82 (stating that the "relationship between the parties involved and the
behaviour of a defendant are the decisive factors" in determining whether plaintiff can invoke unfair
competition); Reichman, supra note 1, at 2476 (noting that in a typical unfair competition model "there
are no well-defined objects of protection," and "no sure standards of eligibility").
247. Competitive harm may be measured in many ways. For example, it may be understood as a
theory of unjust enrichment.
248. For a summary of the U.S. legislative debate, see, for example, Jonathan Band, The Database
Debate in the 108th US Congress: The Saga Continues, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 205 (2005). In
Europe, database protection is gradually becoming established after its introduction in the mid-1990s.
For current commentary, see, for example, Mark J. Davison & P. Bert Hugenholtz, Football Fixtures,
Horseraces and Spin Offs: The ECJ Domesticates the Database Right, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
113(2005).
249. Data Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2004) (as
reported in House). We point to this legislation for its illustrative value, not for the purpose of defend-
ing this particular legislation. We leave to others the broader debate over the merits of data protection
schemes.
250. Id. § 2(4)(A) (stating that "the term 'database' means a collection of a large number of discrete
items of information" brought together so that they can be accessed). Presumably, a molecular dataset
characterizing a particular plant would qualify as a "database" under this provision, such that plants
could quite literally constitute protectable databases under the legislation. That, however, is not our
proposal.
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sources or time," 25 1-a sweat-of-the-brow theory rather than a novelty or
distinctness theory. Liability is allocated based on whether defendant has
inflicted an injury on the plaintiff and on whether withholding liability
would undermine the system's incentives. 252 The legislation offers reme-
dies not limited to monetary relief, but extending to injunctive relief as
well. 253 Because it involves no formal grant of property rights, the legisla-
tion imposes no term limitation but does provide a two-year statute of limi-
tations. 254
B. The Unfair Competition Model Applied to Plant Datasets
Our unfair competition model, as applied to plant datasets, can best be
understood when juxtaposed against existing PVP models. The major sub-
stantive differences between the existing PVP schemes and a proposed
unfair competition scheme would be three, relating to (1) the object of pro-
tection, (2) the criteria for establishing protection, and (3) the scope of pro-
tection.
Unfair competition regimes do not rely on precise ex ante delineation
of protected subject matter. Accordingly, the rule set in a plant unfair com-
petition regime would not need to be shackled to a concept of a plant "vari-
ety," with the ambiguities that it entails. An unfair competition model could
be oriented around plant datasets or, more particularly, commercial value
built up in plant datasets.
Unfair competition regimes also do not require robust criteria for es-
tablishing protection. Phenotype-driven rules like the DUS criteria would
take on a very different role-if any role at all-in a plant unfair competi-
tion regime. 255 As we have seen, as currently applied, the DUS criteria
have become so enmeshed in their own technicalities that their normative
basis has either been minimized or lost.256 In a plant unfair competition
regime, a remedy would be made available where the plant breeder can
satisfy functional criteria reflecting the commercial value of the plant mo-
251. Id. §3(a)(1).
252. Id. § 3(a) (imposing liability for making available to others "a quantitatively substantial part of
the information" in another's qualifying database, without authorization, where "(2) the unauthorized
making available in commerce occurs in a time sensitive manner and inflicts injury on the database or a
product or service offering access to multiple databases; and (3) the ability of other parties to free ride
on the efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce the incentive to produce or make available the database or
the product or service that its existence or quality would be substantially threatened").
253. Id. § 7.
254. Id. § 8.
255. That is, our model does not presuppose that phenotypic comparisons must be discarded in all
circumstances, but it does consign them to a lesser role.
256. See supra Part ll.B.
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lecular dataset at issue. Value might be measured by evidence of a substan-
tial expenditure of financial resources or time or by direct (ex post) assess-
ments of agronomic value. The DUS criteria might still be employed, but
only as proxies for commercial value, not as dispositive indicia of protect-
ability. 257 Overall costs associated with securing protection are shifted ex
post, to litigation.
Finally, in an unfair competition regime, the scope of protection
would not depend on the identification of formal boundary lines coupled
with exemptions. Under an unfair competition regime, the scope of rights
inquiry, embracing inquiries like the identification of EDVs and the appli-
cation of the breeder's exemption, would collapse into a single inquiry
focused on assessing whether a defendant's alleged unfair competition via
the unauthorized exploitation of plaintiffs plant dataset was likely to cause
competitive harm to plaintiff.258
In some respects, this is already beginning to occur. For example, the
EDV concept already has unfair competition overtones-the goal of the
EDV provisions is both "to promote continued investment" in plant breed-
ing and "to discourage unfair or parasitical activities without discouraging
'improvement breeding."'' 259 And Jim Chen has advocated an interpretation
of the breeder's exemption that would allow courts to consider whether the
party invoking the exemption had "clean hands," asserting that the inclu-
sion of the phrase "bona fide research" in the language of the breeder's
exemption provides a basis for holding that "surreptitious acts" cannot be
shielded. 260
Under an unfair competition model, current efforts to implement EDV
provisions by creating codes of conduct for specific crops would still be
relevant. But they would be redirected towards establishing standards of
fair commercial breeding practice-true codes of conduct, that is. Instead
of making EDV thresholds ends in themselves, such codes would recognize
257. There are important institutional consequences. For example, under the proposed scheme,
substantive pre-grant examination for compliance with DUS criteria would not invariably be required.
PVP offices could instead focus on facilitating the development of codes of conduct for breeding speci-
fied crops, for example.
258. In addition to redressing competitive harms-with the goal of balancing ex ante innovation
incentives with reasonable access to innovative products-an unfair competition model also can be
effective in meeting other goals that we ordinarily associate with economic functions of trademarks:
securing reputation of germplasm owners by enjoining imitators who will not observe the same quality
standards; indirectly encouraging private sector investment in germplasm development by providing
assurance that imitators will be kept off the market; and encouraging breeders to maintain consistent
quality, thereby building up goodwill. See, e.g., DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 67, ch. I (discussing
the economic functions of trademarks).
259. UPOV, Model Law, supra note 164, at 149.
260. Chen, supra note 3, at 134-35.
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that the objective is to articulate standards of allowable research behavior,
where thresholds are only modest instrumental tools for accomplishing the
task.
Two other contrasts are noteworthy. First, unfair competition regimes
typically do not rely on fixed terms of protection; rather, they depend upon
statutes of limitation for taking action against competitors. Additionally,
other factors, such as the commercial obsolescence of the plant, would also
be limiting, because it would affect the extent to which a defendant's activ-
ity caused cognizable commercial harm to a plaintiff, thus serving as a
practical term limitation on plaintiff's ability to get a remedy.
Second, unfair competition regimes are amenable to a range of flexi-
ble remedial options. Limited injunctive relief should be among the op-
tions. 261 Remedies could be designed around crop-specific exclusivity
periods reflecting commercial realities, around an arbitrary exclusivity
period during which unauthorized breeding is deemed prima facie to cause
competitive harm, or around other models. The design of an appropriate
menu of remedial options could build on current debates over the proper
scope of the breeder's exemption. 262
C. Certainty and Ex Post Determinations
Beyond threshold concerns such as the resistance in the U.S. to robust
notions of unfair competition at common law, 263 and the obvious fact that
entrenched interests may express the usual reluctance to depart from the
status quo,2 64 unfair competition models typically trade away certainty.
261. The idea of building in exclusivity periods is not foreign to unfair competition law. E.g.,
SANDERS, supra note 242, at 200 (citing, among others, the example of "springboard injunctions" in
British cases involving breach of confidentiality). We disagree with suggestions to convert plant variety
protection into effectively a compulsory licensing regime, where only a damages remedy would be
available. See Kingston. supra note 231, at 4. Like Kingston, we see a role for a new model of protec-
tion as a response to obsolescence. However, Kingston's model strives to fine tune ex ante incentives
for innovative breeders by charging downstream breeders an up front, one-time compulsory licensing
payment. Id. The payment would be calculated not by the level of innovation embodied in any given
variety, but based upon a more complex accounting of the innovative breeder's total investment in
R&D. Id. at 7-8. We are wary about the accounting measures, which seem to us to present the danger of
the Enronning of plant intellectual property protection. Moreover, our unfair competition model oper-
ates differently: it seeks to redress competitive harm and thereby indirectly affect ex ante incentives,
leaving to other regimes, like utility patents, the chief work of establishing incentives.
262. See supra Part IIl.B for a discussion.
263. E.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003) (asserting
that Lanham Act § 43(a) is not a comprehensive unfair competition cause of action); cf Joseph P.
Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1984).
264. Public choice theory would predict that plant breeders, who would inevitably be small players
in the utility patent system, may perceive that system to be less responsive to their needs, and might
therefore prefer a plant-specific regime in which breeders would have great political clout. But this is an
[Vol 82:3
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
This is a serious problem in areas where there is perceived to be a strong
need for the ex ante allocation of rights to provide third-party notice and to
hold down transaction costs.
We think that the certainty concern about a plant unfair competition
model should be taken seriously. 265 There are, however, a number of con-
siderations that mitigate what might otherwise be a knee-jerk reaction
against unfair competition.
First, certainty should be assessed in view of the blend of all intellec-
tual property regimes available to protect plant innovation. In most jurisdic-
tions, plant variety protection does not exist in isolation; it is part of a
complex of intellectual property rights that may be brought to bear on plant
innovation. A regime in which much innovation is protected by utility pat-
ent, where an unfair competition regime operates at the margins of the util-
ity patent scheme, might provide adequate certainty even if an unfair
competition regime positioned as the sole or predominant form of intellec-
tual property protection would not. In a jurisdiction offering unfair compe-
tition protection as the sole form of plant intellectual property protection,
certainty concerns cannot so readily be brushed aside.
Second, the certainty virtues of existing PVP systems are easily over-
stated. Existing DUS criteria do not lend themselves to sharp line-drawing,
a condition likely to become exacerbated with the advance of genotyping.
EDV determinations are unpredictable and are made ex post.266 The very
concept of variety is intrinsically ambiguous.
Related to the certainty concern is another: unfair competition models
rely predominantly on ex post determinations, so that administering such a
model requires a highly sophisticated judiciary. 267 While we do not take
this concern lightly, we question whether the judicial sophistication re-
quired to decide a plant unfair competition matter would exceed very
greatly that required to decide an intricate PVP matter. There may be an-
other, more constructive message here, and further debate over an unfair
argument for a plant-specific regime that is viable over the long term, not necessarily an argument for
the retention of the existing PVP model.
265. Though we do note an irony: uncertainty is especially corrosive in a property rights model like
PVP, which purports to provide a clear ex ante allocation of rights. Unfair competition lacks such
pretensions towards certainty, as a matter of design.
266. Lesser & Mutschler, supra note 198, at 1116 (arguing that because the dependency determina-
tion will always be uncertain and will be made only when the downstream breeder has arrived at a
finished variety, EDVs may have a chilling effect on downstream breeders). In addition to private costs,
there may be social costs-e.g., costs of downstream breeders routinely relying on unprotected varieties
even if those are less promising agronomically, and social costs entailed in cosmetic breeding practices.
Id.
267. Reichman, supra note 1, at 2476 (noting that the unfair competition action "characteristically
proceeds on a hit-or-miss basis that varies with the outlook of single judges").
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competition model may be useful for amplifying that message: that regard-
less of whether unfair competition or PVP models emerge as the best future
model, those models might best be implemented with an eye towards an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism-a uniform dispute resolution
policy for plants, as it were.268 That, however, is an argument for develop-
ment elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
The UPOV treaty will soon reach its 50th anniversary. There are rea-
sons to celebrate this milestone. When it was created, the PVP system was
an intellectual property innovation, providing plant breeders with a modest
form of intellectual property protection at a time when it was unclear
whether utility patent systems would be open to them. The UPOV organi-
zation created by the treaty has become the preeminent world forum for the
discussion of plant-related intellectual property. PVP systems are recog-
nized in the TRIPS agreement, as an alternative intellectual property re-
gime in countries where utility patent protection for plants may be
politically infeasible in the short term. Additionally, the plant breeding
industry has invested significantly in implementing UPOV systems, and in
developing innovative institutional frameworks, such as the framework for
facilitating alternative dispute resolution in EDV disputes.The coming
semi-centennial of the UPOV treaty should also provide the occasion for
constructive reexamination of the core assumptions and design features of
PVP systems. When the UPOV treaty was drafted, the chemical structure
of DNA had only recently been elucidated. The biotechnology industry had
not yet been born. Plant molecular techniques in widespread use today, and
the hardware and software platforms for implementing them, had not been
invented. Key judicial decisions on the patent eligibility of living subject
matter had not yet been rendered. Just as any intellectual property system
should be reexamined in view towards accommodating rapid technological
and legal change, PVP systems should have the benefit of a comprehensive
review that is not hampered by the a priori conclusion that basic elements
of the existing system must be retained without change.
In this Article, we have sought to provide a foundation for a modern
debate about the fundamentals of the PVP model by juxtaposing existing
268. Experience with the design of another international alternative dispute resolution mechanism
for intellectual property-the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy-may prove instruc-
tive. For relevant commentary, see Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-
National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 141 (2001).
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phenotype-driven PVP rules against technical literature reflecting geno-
type-driven orientation of contemporary plant breeding research. We have
sought to raise questions about the incompatibilities between the two. To
demonstrate that the best way forward for resolving these incompatibilities
need not take the form of further adaptations to the existing PVP model, we
have sketched out an alternative model, based on unfair competition princi-
ples. The unfair competition model is intended to provide a starting point
for debate. At the end of that debate, it may be determined that an unfair
competition model provides a useful substantive framework for incorporat-
ing successful aspects of existing PVP systems into a more adaptable,
blended intellectual property regime. We have suggested that a blend of
PVP principles in an unfair competition model may prove especially attrac-
tive in countries where meaningful utility patent for biotechnological sub-
ject matter is also available, and the' blended PVP/unfair competition
regime can serve as an important adjunct.
We believe that PVP systems and institutions will continue to prove to
be receptive to constructive debate about systemic changes. If not, the con-
sequences for the plant breeding community (and, indeed, for global food
and fiber production) could be unfortunate, because the threat of techno-
logical obsolescence of the PVP model is serious. The broader legal impli-
cations-that sui generis intellectual property regimes tend to become
locked in to technological models, and that their supporting institutions
tend to become impervious to large-scale reform-would also be revelatory
for future intellectual property policymakers.
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